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international bodies and explores possible interpretations of the concept of the rule of law. Subsequently, 
the paper places the international judiciary in its political context and analyses the institutional safeguards 
of the courts’ independence and impartiality. Finally, the authors provide a preliminary comparative 
analysis of the many ways in which international courts may arguably strengthen the rule of law and 
concludes by taking a closer look at the remaining challenges that the international judiciary faces today. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, international adjudication has undergone dramatic changes. 
Not only has the quantity of international judicial bodies significantly increased, today’s 
international courts and tribunals 1 also wield considerably more power than their predecessors 
and adjudicate an ever-growing number of cases. Over the past two decades there has been a 
multiplication of bodies that match the criteria of an international court or tribunal, in the sense 
that they are (1) permanent institutions, (2) composed of independent judges, (3) adjudicate 
disputes between two or more entities, at least one of which must be a State or an international 
organization,2 and (4) render binding decisions, (5) on the basis of predetermined procedural 
and substantive rules of international law.3 While up until the end of the Cold War only a handful 
of courts and tribunals existed,4 they have since been joined by a large number of general, 
specialized and regional courts and tribunals. Based on the above-mentioned criteria, more than 
20 international courts currently active can be identified, 5 as well as a considerable number of 
                                               
1 The terms ‘international court’ and ‘international tribunal’ are treated as essentially synonymous for the purposes of 
this paper. 
2 This also encompasses international criminal courts and tribunals. While states are not parties to the proceedings, 
an organ of the international court – the Prosecutor – brings cases against individuals. 
3 Criteria used by the Project on International Courts and Tribunals (PiCT), see <http://www.pict-
pcti.org/matrix/matrixhome.html> accessed 15 January 2015; see similar definition applied in Cesare PR Romano, ‘A 
Taxonomy of International Rule of Law Institutions’ (2011) 2 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 241, 261 et 
seq. 
4 Among them the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), the Court of Justice of the 
Benelux Economic Union (CJBEU) and the Andean Tribunal of Justice (ATJ). See also Andreas Follesdal, ‘Epilogue: 
reflections on international courts and tribunals’ in Geert De Baere and Jan Wouters (eds), The Contribution of 
International and Supranational Courts to the Rule of Law (Edward Elgar, forthcoming). 
5 This includes the ICJ, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and the Appellate Body of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO AB), the human rights courts (ECtHR, IACtHR, African Court of Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (ACtHPR)), the economic integration courts in Europe (CJEU, CJBEU, Economic Court of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States, European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Court), in Africa (Organization for the 
Harmonization of Corporate Law in Africa Common Court of Justice and Arbitration, East African Community Court of 
Justice, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Court of Justice), in the Americas (ATJ, Caribbean 
Court of Justice, Mercosur Dispute Settlement System, Central American Court of Justice) and in Asia (ASEAN 
Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism) as well as the International Criminal Court (ICC), and a large number of 
international administrative tribunals (AT) or boards (among the international organizations which have established an 
AT are the African Development Bank, the Arab League, the Asian Development Bank, the Council of Europe, the 
EU, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Space Agency, the European Stability 
Mechanism, the Inter-American Development Bank, the International Labour Organization (ILO), the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), the Organization of American States (OAS), the World Bank and the UN (now UN Dispute 
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bodies that are inactive or have a minimal case-load.6 Extending the definition to include non-
permanent adjudicative bodies, one can add a large number of ad hoc or hybrid criminal 
tribunals, 7 arbitral tribunals8 and international claims tribunals.9  
Not only the number of available tribunals has increased, but also the number of cases on their 
dockets and consequently their judicial output. Alter counts 3300 judicial decisions issued 
collectively by all international courts until 1989, and 34000 judicial decisions in the period 
between 1990 and 2011.10 This increase in judicial output is certainly tied to the establishment 
of new adjudicative bodies, several of which have been particularly active, for example the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System, which generated 188 panel reports and 110 appellate reports 
                                                                                                                                                       
Tribunal and UN Appeals Tribunal). The entries listed in this and the subsequent footnotes are based on the courts 
identified in the following works: Karen J Alter, The New Terrain of International Law: Courts, Politics, Rights 
(Princeton University Press 2014) 72 et seq.; Henry G Schermers and Niels M Blokker, International Institutional Law: 
Unity within Diversity (5th edn, Brill 2011) 439 et seq., para 605 et seq.; Romano (n 3) 261 et seq.; Ruth Mackenzie, 
Cesare PR Romano, Yuval Shany and Philippe Sands, Manual on International Courts and Tribunals (OUP 2010); 
and William A Schabas, Solomon T Ebobrah, Carl Baudenbacher/Michael-James Clifton, David D Caron, Christoph 
Schreuer and Chittharanjan F Amerasinghe in the section ‘Orders and Families of International Adjudicative Bodies’ 
of The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication edited by Cesare PR Romano, Karen Alter and Yuval Shany 
(OUP 2014); for more information see also the case law databases World Courts (<www.worldcourts.com/>) and 
WorldLII (<www.worldlii.org/int/cases/>), and the international court directory of the iCourts project 
(<http://jura.ku.dk/icourts/caselaw-finder/>). 
6 The categorization into active and inactive/less active courts varies, depending on the source. Courts that have 
been labelled as inactive or having a minimal caseload include e.g. the European Nuclear Energy Tribunal, the 
European Tribunal on State Immunity, the Judicial Tribunal of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting 
Countries, the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of Central African States, the Judicial Organ of the Arab 
Maghreb Union, the Court of Justice of the African Economic Community, the Court of Justice of the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union, the Court of Justice of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the 
Southern Africa Development Community Tribunal, the Court of Justice of the Central African Monetary Community, 
and the Court of Justice of the African Union; sources see above (n 5). 
7 These notably include the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the UN Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (UNMICT), which will take 
over functions of the ICTY and the ICTR after the end of their mandate, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (and the 
Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone), the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
of Cambodia, the War Crimes Chamber of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the most recent Extraordinary 
African Chambers. 
8 It is impossible to provide an exhaustive list of all international arbitral tribunals. Among the more permanent bodies 
are e.g. the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the International Joint Commission, the Bank for International 
Settlements Arbitral Tribunal, the International Civil Aviation Organization Council, the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes, the Gulf Cooperation Council Commission for the Settlement of Disputes, the 
Court of Arbitration for Sport, the North American Commission on Environmental Cooperation, the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Dispute Settlement System, the Organization for the Harmonization of Corporate 
Law in Africa Common Court of Justice and Arbitration and the World Intellectual Property Organization Arbitration 
and Mediation Center; sources see above (n 5). 
9 Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth century, almost 90 of these bodies were established (Romano (n 3) 
264). Today among others the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (IUSCT), the Marshall Islands Nuclear Claims 
Tribunal, and the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission remain in existence, sources see above (n 5). 
10 Alter only identifies two dozen international courts, see Karen Alter, ‘The Multiplication of International Courts and 
Tribunals After the End of the Cold War’, in Cesare PR Romano, Karen Alter, Yuval Shany (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Adjudication (OUP 2014) 65, 68. 
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between 1995 and 2013.11 But also pre-existing international courts have been utilized more 
frequently in the past decades. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), for example, has 
delivered 116 judgments since 1946, of which 65 alone since 1990.12 This increased recourse to 
international adjudication has created a wealth of case law on many areas of international law. 
In addition to this, the new generation of international courts frequently enjoys more power than 
their older counterparts and has taken on new roles, which indicates not only a quantitative, but 
also a qualitative change in the international judiciary.13 Whereas international courts were 
traditionally only mandated with dispute settlement between states, they today fulfil multiple 
functions, including the judicial review of acts and practices of domestic and international 
authorities, the prosecution of perpetrators of international crimes, the provision of authoritative 
interpretations and clarifications of the law, as well as the promotion of the development of 
international law.14 Whereas the international judiciary was traditionally dependent on the 
voluntary acceptance of its jurisdiction by the parties, several of the newer international courts 
have compulsory jurisdiction, and some older international courts have been granted 
compulsory jurisdiction through subsequent reforms.15 Finally, international adjudication is no 
longer a state-only affair, with more and more courts either enabling individuals to submit their 
claims or holding them accountable for violations of international law.16  
To say that these developments have attracted a lot of scholarly attention would be an 
understatement. Recent years have seen numerous studies mapping the new world of 
international courts,17 analyzing their roles and powers,18 assessing their effectiveness,19 and 
                                               
11 See Peter Van den Bossche, ‘The Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization’ in Geert De Baere and Jan 
Wouters (eds), The Contribution of International and Supranational Courts to the Rule of Law (Edward Elgar, 
forthcoming). 
12 See Philippe Couvreur, ‘The International Court of Justice’ in Geert De Baere and Jan Wouters (eds), The 
Contribution of International and Supranational Courts to the Rule of Law (Edward Elgar, forthcoming). 
13 Alter (n 4) 64; Jenny Martinez, ‘Towards an International Judicial System’ (2003) 56 Stanford Law Review 429, 438 
et seq.; Christopher J Borgen, ‘Transnational Tribunals and the Transmission of Norms: The Hegemony of Process’ 
(2007) 39 George Washington International Law Review 685, 686 et seq. 
14 Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke, ‘On the Functions of International Courts: An Appraisal in Light of Their 
Burgeoning Public Authority’ (2012) Amsterdam Center for International Law, ACIL Research Paper No 2012/10, 2. 
15 See e.g. Van den Bossche (n 11). See also part XV of UNCLOS, which provides for compulsory jurisdiction but 
leaves the State Parties the choice of forum (ITLOS, ICJ, arbitration): see Philippe Gautier, ‘The contribution of the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to the rule of law’ in Geert De Baere and Jan Wouters (eds), The 
Contribution of International and Supranational Courts to the Rule of Law (Edward Elgar, forthcoming). See Protocol 
No 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, restructuring the control 
machinery established thereby, adopted 11 May 1994, entered into force 1 November 1998, ETS No 5, which 
established the compulsory jurisdiction of the ECtHR. However, some courts have been unaffected by this 
development, as exemplified by the persistently low number of states which have accepted the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the ICJ under art 36(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute) (currently 71 
declarations). 
16 E.g. natural and legal persons may appear before the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the ITLOS (see Gautier (n 
15)); individuals may bring claims before the reformed ECtHR (see Paul Lemmens, ‘The contribution of the European 
Court of Human Rights to the rule of law’ in Geert De Baere and Jan Wouters (eds), The Contribution of International 
and Supranational Courts to the Rule of Law (Edward Elgar, forthcoming)); the international criminal tribunals (n 5) 
have the competence to prosecute individuals for international crimes. 
17 Romano (n 3). 
18 See for example iCourts, the Danish National Research Foundation's Centre of Excellence for International Courts, 
which was created in 2012 for the study of the role and impact of international courts, <http://jura.ku.dk/icourts/>; 
Dinah Shelton, ‘Form, Function, and the Powers of International Courts’ (2009) 9 Chicago Journal of International 
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measuring their legitimacy.20 Several scholars and practitioners have voiced concerns about the 
‘proliferation’ of international courts, in particular referring to potentially conflicting jurisdictions 
and the fragmentation of international law through contradictory judgments.21 Nevertheless, the 
benefits of the increasing judicialization of the international order have also been highlighted, 22 
and the scarcity of conflicts and contradictions has been emphasized.23 Several studies suggest 
solutions, ranging from the avoidance of double proceedings to the establishment of a judicial 
dialogue among international judges.24 Nevertheless, knowledge gaps remain. In particular, 
                                                                                                                                                       
Law 537; Anna Spain, ‘Examining the International Judicial Function: International Courts as Dispute Resolvers’ 
(2011) 34 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 5; von Bogdandy and Venzke (n 14); 
Alter (n 5). 
19 Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts (OUP 2014) and ‘Assessing the Effectiveness of 
International Courts: A Goal-Based Approach’ (2012) 106 American Journal of International Law 225, see also 226 fn 
5; Laurence R Helfer, ‘The Effectiveness of International Adjudicators’ in Cesare PR Romano, Karen Alter, Yuval 
Shany (eds) The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication (OUP 2014) 464. 
20 See for example the project PluriCourts at the University of Oslo, which studies the legitimacy of international 
courts and tribunals from an interdisciplinary perspective, <www.jus.uio.no/pluricourts/english/>; Tullio Treves, 
‘Aspects of Legitimacy of Decisions of International Courts and Tribunals’ with comments by Rein Müllerson, in 
Rüdiger Wolfrum and Volker Röben (eds), Legitimacy in International Law (Springer 2008) 169 et seq,; Yuka 
Fukunaga, ‘Civil Society and the Legitimacy of the WTO Dispute Settlement System’ (2009) 34 Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law 85; Nienke Grossman, ‘The Normative Legitimacy of International Courts’ (2013) 86 Temple Law 
Review 61; Koen Lenaerts, ‘How the ECJ Thinks: A Study on Judicial Legitimacy’ (2013) 36 Fordham International 
Law Journal 1302; Geir Ulfstein, ‘International courts and judges: independence, interaction and legitimacy’ (2014) 46 
NYU Journal of International Law and Policy 849; see also the issue ‘International Courts and the Quest for 
Legitimacy’ of the Journal Theoretical Inquiries in Law, Vol. 14, Issue 2, 2013. 
21 Gilbert Guillaume, ‘The proliferation of international judicial bodies: The outlook for the international legal order’, 
Speech to the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly, 27 October 2000 and Gilbert Guillaume, ‘Advantages 
and Risks of Proliferation: A Blueprint for Action’ (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 300; Thomas 
Buergenthal, ‘Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: Is it Good or Bad? (2001) 14 Leiden Journal of 
International Law, 267, 272 et seq.; JG Merrills, ‘The Mosaic of International Dispute Settlement Procedures: 
Complementary or Contradictory?’ (2007) 54 Netherlands International Law Review 361. 
22 See Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, ‘Prologue: an overview of the contribution of international tribunals to the 
rule of law’ in Geert De Baere and Jan Wouters (eds), The Contribution of International and Supranational Courts to 
the Rule of Law (Edward Elgar, forthcoming). 
23 Chester Brown, A Common Law of International Adjudication (OUP 2007); Jonathan I. Charney, ‘The impact on the 
international legal system of the growth of international courts and tribunals’ (1999) NYU Journal of International Law 
and Policy 697; Buergenthal (n 21) 271 et seq.; Martti Koskenniemi and Päivi Leino, ‘Fragmentation of International 
Law? Postmodern Anxieties’ (2002) 15 Leiden Journal of International Law 553; Fausto Pocar, ‘The Proliferation of 
International Criminal Courts and Tribunals: A Necessity in the Current International Community’ (2004) 2 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 304; Rosalyn Higgins, ‘The ICJ, the United Nations System, and the Rule of Law’, 
Speech delivered at the London School of Economics, 13 November 2006 and Rosalyn Higgins, ‘A Babel of Judicial 
Voices? Ruminations from the Bench’ (2006) 55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 791. 
24 Karin Oellers-Frahm, ‘Multiplication of International Courts and Tribunals and Conflicting Jurisdiction - Problems 
and Possible Solutions’ (2001) 5 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 67; Merrills (n 21); Nele Matz-Lück, 
‘Promoting the Unity of International Law: Standard-Setting by International Tribunals’ in Doris König, Peter-Tobias 
Stoll, Volker Röben and Nele Matz-Lück (eds) International Law Today: New Challenges and the Need for Reform? 
(Springer 2008) 99; Nikolaos Lavranos, ‘Regulating Competing Jurisdictions Among International Courts and 
Tribunals’ (2008) 68 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 575; Suzannah Linton and Firew 
Kebede Tiba, ‘The International Judge in an Age of Multiple International Courts and Tribunals’ (2009) 9 Chicago 
Journal of International Law 407; Joost Pauwelyn and Luiz Eduardo Salles, ‘Forum Shopping Before International 
Tribunals: (Real) Concerns, (Im)Possible Solutions’ (2009) 42 Cornell International Law Journal 77; see also the 
address by Judge Schwebel to the Plenary session of the UN General Assembly on 26 October 1999, where he 
argued in favour of enabling international courts and tribunals to request advisory opinions from the ICJ. 
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there is still a lack of understanding of the functioning of international courts and of their 
contribution to the rule of law at the international, regional and domestic levels. 
Almost in parallel to the expansion of international adjudication, the concept of the rule of law 
has taken center stage. Possibly fuelled by the political changes after the end of the Cold War, 
the rule of law has turned into a ‘panacea for the ills of countries in transition’.25 It has developed 
into a leitmotiv in international relations and is being referred to in countless policy documents, 
in various contexts. Having so far eluded a clear-cut definition, the rule of law has been 
employed flexibly, and is open to a variety of interpretations.26 The 2012 UN General Assembly 
(UNGA) Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at 
the National and International Levels (‘the 2012 Declaration’) 27 illustrates the different facets 
associated with the rule of law, ranging from terrorism, to corruption, organized crime, 
development and conflict prevention, to name but a few. This elasticity may be expedient at the 
policy level,28 but its implications for the rule of law remain uncertain, particularly as regards its 
translation from the domestic to the international level.29 
The present paper constitutes an adapted version of the introductory chapter to the book The 
Contribution of International and Supranational Courts to the Rule of Law30, which is 
forthcoming in 2015. This book aims to make a contribution to the on-going academic debate by 
taking a closer look at the actual functioning and work of a set of international and supranational 
courts and tribunals31 and by analysing their contribution to the rule of law at the international, 
regional and domestic levels. This paper develops an analytical framework for this purpose. 
After a brief historical overview of the rise of international adjudication (2), it clarifies the 
distinction between supranational and international bodies (3). In the light of the indeterminacy 
of the concept of the rule of law, we then provide an exploration of its possible conceptions (4). 
Subsequently, we place the international judiciary in its political context and analyse the 
institutional safeguards of the courts’ independence and impartiality (5). Finally, we provide a 
preliminary comparative analysis of the many ways in which international courts may arguably 
strengthen the rule of law (6) and conclude by taking a closer look at the remaining challenges 
that the international judiciary faces today (7). 
                                               
25 Thomas Carothers, ‘The Rule of Law Revival’ (1998) 77 Foreign Affairs 95. 
26 See Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure’, in: James E Fleming (ed.) Getting to the 
Rule of Law (NYU Press 2011) 3, 4 et seq., on the gap between formal conceptions of the term in legal philosophy, 
and its actual use outside the field. 
27 UNGA Res 67/1 (24 September 2012) UN Doc A/RES/67/1. 
28 Philip Alston, ‘The concept of the rule of law and the way it has been dealt with at the international level’, lecture 
held at the EIUC Venice Academy of Human Rights 2014 – ‘Judicial Legitimacy and the Rule of Law’, 9 July 2014. 
29 See below, section 4.2. 
30 Geert de Baere and Jan Wouters (eds), The Contribution of International and Supranational Courts to the Rule of 
Law (Edward Elgar, forthcoming). 
31 Based on Romano’s ‘taxonomy’ of international adjudicative bodies, a sample of courts was selected, illustrating 
the spectrum of international and supranational courts: a state-only court with general jurisdiction (ICJ), two state-only 
courts with specialized jurisdiction (International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Appellate Body of the World Trade 
Organization), a court of a regional integration organization (Court of Justice of the European Union), a human rights 
court (European Court of Human Rights), as well as a permanent, an ad hoc and a hybrid international criminal court 
(International Criminal Court, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
respectively). In addition, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (IUSCT) was selected as an example of an 
international claims and compensations body that has made a considerable contribution to international arbitration 
law. 
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2. THE MULTIPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 
While international adjudication in the form of arbitration dates back at least to Roman times, it 
was only in the late nineteenth century that the idea of a permanent international court took 
shape.32 A standing body was considered to have several advantages, among them increased 
effectiveness, due to its ready availability, as well as the contribution that its case law would 
make to the development of international law. Proposals towards a standing international court 
were submitted at the First Hague Peace Conference (1899).33 Ultimately, however, the 
delegates could only agree on the creation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), which 
famously is neither a court, nor permanent but only acts as a secretariat that facilitates 
arbitration between its Members.34 The Second Hague Peace Conference (1907) reached an 
agreement on the creation of a Permanent Prize Court, but the body never came into being. 
Nevertheless, the conference did sow the seeds for the later foundation of a permanent judicial 
body.35 
It was only after the end of the First World War that a permanent international court with general 
jurisdiction was finally established. The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) (1922-
1946) did not have compulsory jurisdiction over the Member States of the League of Nations, 
but Members could voluntarily accept the jurisdiction of the Court. Although operating in the 
conflict-ridden inter-war era, the PCIJ’s body of case law has been widely recognized for its 
valuable contribution to international law, which still serves as a reference point for international 
courts today.36 The PCIJ established the role of a permanent adjudicative body at the 
international level and to that extent introduced the rule of law to international relations.37  
                                               
32 Mary Ellen O’Connell and Lenore VanderZee, ‘The History of International Adjudication’ in Cesare PR Romano, 
Karen Alter, Yuval Shany (eds) The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication (OUP 2014) 40. 
33 ibid 47. 
34 Jan Wouters, ‘De proliferatie van internationale rechtscolleges: goed of slecht?’ in Bart Raymaekers and Gerd van 
Riel (eds) De horizonten van weten en kunnen. Lessen voor de eenentwintigste eeuw (Vol 8, Universitaire Pers 
Leuven 2002) 123. 
35 See Geert De Baere and Alex Mills, ‘TMC Asser and Public and Private International Law: The Life and Legacy of 
“a Practical Legal Statesman”’ (2011) 42 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 28-29. 
36 See e.g. PCIJ, The case of the S.S. ‘Lotus’ (France v Turkey) PCIJ Rep Series A No 10, p. 18, where the PCIJ 
held: ‘International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law binding upon States therefore 
emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing 
principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing independent 
communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the independence of States 
cannot therefore be presumed’. This constitutes the so-called ‘Lotus principle’, according to which in international law 
everything that is not subject to a specific prohibition is permitted. The continued validity of the principle was 
challenged by the question in ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 
1996, p 226: ‘Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?’ 
However, the ICJ held that ‘the argument concerning the legal conclusions to be drawn from the use of the word 
“permitted”, and the questions of burden of proof to which it was said to give rise, are without particular significance 
for the disposition of the issues before the Court’ (at 239, para 22). See Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Case Analysis: Faith, 
Identity, and the Killing of the Innocent: International Lawyers and Nuclear Weapons’ (1997) 10 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 139-140; see also the Declaration of Judge Simma in ICJ, Accordance with International Law of the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2010, p 403, criticizing 
the ICJ’s upholding of the Lotus principle. On the contribution of the PCIJ to international law see Ole Spiermann, 
International Legal Argument in the Permanent Court of International Justice (CUP 2005); and Christian Tams, 
Malgosia Fitzmaurice (eds) Legacies of the Permanent Court of International Justice (Brill 2013). 
37 Wouters (n 34) 4. 
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Its reputation unscathed by the war,38 the PCIJ was considered a success and its institutional 
and legal framework were therefore left largely untouched when the ICJ was created as its 
successor. At the same time, the International Military Tribunals of Nuremberg (1945-46) and 
Tokyo (1946-48) laid the groundwork for international criminal adjudication.39 But the end of the 
Second World War also heralded a shift of attention from the global to the regional level. On the 
European continent, the post-war years witnessed an increased move towards the promotion of 
economic integration, human rights and the rule of law. The Court of Justice of the European 
Coal and Steel Communities (now Court of Justice of the European Union, CJEU) 40 was 
established in 1952, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) followed in 1958. On the 
American continent the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was founded in 1959, 
joined in 1979 by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
However, during the Cold War, the multiplication of international courts and tribunals slowed 
down. The changing political landscape after the collapse of the East-West dichotomy created 
the ‘permissive environment’ needed for the establishment of an increasing number of 
international courts and tribunals.41 Since the 1990s, international courts sprang up in almost all 
corners of the world, covering a wide range of legal areas. The majority have a jurisdiction 
ratione territoriae limited to a specific region. 42 However, with the Appellate Body of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO AB, 1994), the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS, 
1996) and the International Criminal Court (ICC, 2002), three specialized international courts 
with a global reach were created.43  
Nevertheless, it would be an oversimplification to regard the development of the international 
judiciary as a ‘linear story of successes’.44 Scholarship traditionally focuses on those 
adjudicative bodies that have actually successfully taken up their work, thereby risking to detract 
from the fact that a large number of bodies exists only on paper or have fallen into a state of 
dormancy. Romano rightly observes that ‘[f]or every contemporary thriving body, there are at 
least twice as many that failed to set sail, or got caught in the doldrums, or even sunk after 
                                               
38 O’Connell and VanderZee (n 32) 56. 
39 See for more detail Luc Reydams and Jan Wouters, ‘The Politics of Establishing International Criminal Tribunals’ in 
Luc Reydams, Jan Wouters and Cedric Ryngaert (eds) International Prosecutors (OUP 2012) 6. 
40 Under the first para of art 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (Consolidated version of the Treaty on 
European Union [2012] OJ C326/13), the institution of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) encompasses the Court 
of Justice (ECJ), the General Court (EGC) and specialized courts (at present, the EU Civil Service Tribunal). 
41 Alter (n 10) 75; Martinez (n 13) 437. On the impact of the end of the Cold War on the development of international 
law more generally, see James Crawford and Sarah Nouwen (eds), Select Proceedings of the European Society of 
International Law, Volume 3, 2010 (Hart 2012). 
42 This includes for example the ICTY and the ICTR, which were established by the UN Security Council to prosecute 
perpetrators of international crimes ‘in the territory of the former Yugoslavia’ and ‘in the territory of Rwanda and […] 
neighboring states’ (the latter applies ratione personae only to Rwandan citizens), see Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, UNSC Res 827 (1993) UN Doc S/RES/827 (ICTY Statute) art 1, and 
Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, UNSC Res 955 (1994) UN Doc S/Res/955 (ICTR Statute) art 1. 
43 There are calls for additional specialized international tribunals, for example in the areas of international human 
rights law, environmental law or investment law. See Julia Kozma, Manfred Nowak and Martin Scheinin, ‘A World 
Court of Human Rights – Consolidated Draft Statute and Commentary’, May 2010, 
<www.eui.eu/Documents/DepartmentsCentres/Law/Professors/Scheinin/ConsolidatedWorldCourtStatute.pdf>; ICE 
Coalition – Creating the International Court for the Environment, <http://icecoalition.com>; Michael Goldhaber, 
‘Wanted: a world investment court’ (2004) 3 Transnational Dispute Settlement. 
44 Cesare PR Romano, ‘Trial and Error in International Judicialization’ in Cesare PR Romano, Karen Alter, Yuval 
Shany (eds) The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication (OUP 2014) 112. 
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launch’.45 Examples include the European Nuclear Energy Tribunal,46 the European Tribunal on 
State Immunity,47 the Judicial Tribunal of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OAPEC),48 the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of Central African States 
(ECCAS),49 the Judicial Organ of the Arab Maghreb Union50 and the Court of Justice of the 
African Economic Community.51 Not much attention has been paid to these unsuccessful 
attempts towards international judicialization and more research is needed to analyze the 
underlying factors that determine the success or failure of an international court, and ultimately 
to create a coherent and inclusive theoretical framework. 
Similarly, the conclusion that judicialization has occurred evenly would be premature, both in 
terms of geographic and thematic scope.52 All but five of the currently existing international 
courts have a jurisdiction ratione territoriae limited to a specific region and not all regions of the 
world are evenly judicialized. In particular, the Asian-Pacific and the Arab regions remain blank 
spots on the map of international adjudication. In terms of thematic coverage, judicialization has 
occurred mostly in the areas of human rights, international criminal law, trade, intellectual 
property, property and investment.53 Cases in other areas such as defence or the environment 
rarely reach an international tribunal and have so far not seen the creation of any specialized 
court.54 And even those areas that appear prima facie highly judicialized may have gaps with 
regard to certain issues. While for example, the competence of international human rights courts 
to deal with civil and political rights is widely accepted, the justiciability of economic, social and 
cultural rights continues to be contested.55 
                                               
45 Ibid. 
46 The Convention on the Establishment of a Security Control in the Field of Nuclear Energy and the Protocol on the 
Tribunal established by the Convention were adopted in 1957 and entered into force in 1959. However, so far the 
court has received no cases. OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, ‘European Nuclear Energy Tribunal’ <https://www.oecd-
nea.org/law/european-nuclear-tribunal.html>. 
47 The European Tribunal on State Immunity was inaugurated in 1985 but has not received a case yet. See 
Schermers and Blokker (n 5) 457 et seq., para 633. 
48 The Judicial Tribunal of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) was established by a 
Protocol signed in 1978, which entered into force in 1980, see <www.oapecorg.org/Home/About-Us/Organizational-
Structure/Council-of-Ministers/Judicial-Tribunal>. At the time of writing, it had only received two cases and it is widely 
regarded as dormant. See Romano (n 44) 117 et seq.; Mackenzie, Romano, Shany and Sands (n 5) 250. 
49 The Court was created by the Treaty Establishing the Economic Community of Central African States (adopted 18 
October 1983, entered into force 18 December 1984), see art 16 et seq. It is not yet operational, see <www.ceeac-
eccas.org/index.php/fr/a-propos-de-la-ceeac/organes-de-la-ceeac>. 
50 The Judicial Organ was founded in 1989: see art 13 of the Treaty Establishing the Arab Maghreb Union (adopted 
17 February 1989, entered into force 1 July 1989). It holds regular meetings but there are no public records of cases 
received so far, see <www.aict-ctia.org/courts_subreg/amu/amu_home.html>. 
51 The Court of Justice of the African Economic Community (AEC) was established by the Treaty Establishing the 
African Economic Community (adopted 3 June 1991, entered into force 12 May 1994) art 18 et seq. It is considered 
to be dormant. See Romano (n 44) 113. 
52 Ulfstein (n 20) 849. 
53 Cesare PR Romano, ‘The Shadow Zones of International Judicialization’ in Cesare PR Romano, Karen Alter, Yuval 
Shany (eds) The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication (OUP 2014) 104. 
54 ibid 105. 
55 Aoife Nolan, Bruce Porter and Malcolm Langford, ‘The Justiciability of Social and Economic Rights: An Updated 
Appraisal’ (2007) NYU Centre for Human Rights and Global Justice Working Paper Series, No 15, 1 et seq.; Michael 
J Dennis and David P Stewart, ‘Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Should There Be an 
International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?’ (2004) 98 
American Journal of International Law 462. 
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3. SUPRANATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM 
The title of the volume ‘The Contribution of International and Supranational Courts to the Rule of 
Law’ suggests that a distinction can be made between international and supranational courts. 
But what exactly are the characteristics that set a supranational court apart from its international 
counterpart, and where to draw the line? The terms are often used interchangeably, which may 
be due to the fact that there is currently no single definition of supranationalism. Various 
scholars have identified different characteristics which they associate with supranational 
organizations. Schermers and Blokker, for example, propose the following basic indicators: 
(1) The organization has the power to take decisions that are binding on the Member 
States. 
(2) The organs taking these decisions are not entirely dependent on the cooperation of 
all Member States (for example composed of independent individuals, decision-
making by majority vote). 
(3) The organization has the power to adopt rules that directly bind the inhabitants of 
the Member States. 
(4) The organization has the power to enforce its decisions, even if only through the 
help of an organ of the Member States. 
(5) The organization enjoys some financial autonomy. 
(6) No unilateral withdrawal from the organization is possible. The organization cannot 
be dissolved without the collaboration of it is own organs.56 
While these indicators are primarily tailored to fit rulemaking organizations, they can also to a 
large extent be applied to judicial bodies. There is currently no organization that fulfils all of the 
criteria, but many match the description to various degrees. It is therefore important to consider 
the ‘international’ or ‘supranational’ character of a court not as an absolute value, but as a 
sliding scale, on which some courts are located further on the side of supranationalism, and 
others less so.  
The different degrees of supranationalism are apparent already with regard to the first criterion. 
All international courts and tribunals have the power to take decisions that are binding on the 
Member States. For most, however, this power exists only under the condition that the 
respective Members have voluntarily accepted the jurisdiction of the judicial body. It might 
therefore be argued that judicial bodies such as the WTO AB, the ECtHR and the CJEU, which 
have compulsory jurisdiction over their Members, are more supranational in this respect than 
others such as the ICJ, for which jurisdiction is optional. 
With respect to the second criterion, all selected courts and tribunals57 can issue their 
judgments, decisions, opinions or reports without the cooperation of their Member States. They 
are composed of independent judges whose freedom from external – particularly political – 
pressures is safeguarded by various institutional means.58 With regard to the broader political 
                                               
56 Schermers and Blokker (n 5) 56 et seq., para 61; see also José E Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-
makers (OUP 2005) 16; Jan Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law (2nd edn, CUP 2009) 24 et 
seq. 
57 See supra (n 31). 
58 See below, section 5. 
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framework, however, a certain degree of political influence cannot be entirely ruled out. States 
retain certain means of control through their political leverage, which may be stronger or 
weaker, depending on the level of competition and the degree of policy diversity between the 
Member States. The degree of dependence may therefore impact on the internationalism or 
supranationalism of a court. Benvenisti and Downs, for example, consider the ICJ to be a more 
dependent court, due to the strong scrutiny exercised by the Permanent Members of the UN 
Security Council, and the ECtHR to be a more independent court, due to the high degree of 
competition between the Member States of the Council of Europe.59 This would support the 
assumption of a more pronounced supranational character of the latter, in contrast to the 
former. 
Furthermore, supranational institutions have the power to make rules that directly bind the 
inhabitants of the Member States. Again, some courts fulfil this criterion to a higher degree than 
others. State-only courts, such as the ICJ, the WTO AB and the ITLOS, only have jurisdiction 
over cases between states.60 Their decisions formally only bind the parties to the dispute, 
although in reality they may have indirect consequences for the inhabitants of a Member State 
and/or the cases may largely be driven by private parties.61 Other courts appear to be more 
supranational in this respect. This includes in particular the international criminal courts, which 
decide on the international criminal responsibility of individuals.62 
The last three criteria of Schermers’ definition of supranationalism are less frequently matched 
by international courts and tribunals. In particular, in contrast to national courts, international 
courts are generally not backed by a reliable enforcement procedure carried out by independent 
authorities. Reference can be made to Article 94 of the UN Charter, an option hardly ever used, 
which allows the party of a judgment delivered by the ICJ to have recourse to the UN Security 
Council if the other party fails to meet the obligations of the judgment.63 Reference should also 
be made to the WTO Dispute Settlement System, which aims to ensure compliance with the 
outcome of cases by allowing for compensation and retaliation. Particularly the latter – self-
enforcement by the Member State – is a means of exercising significant political and economic 
pressure on the other party, at least in cases of relative economic equality.64 Nevertheless, the 
enforcement mechanism for ECJ judgments is unusually strong for international law. The 
European Commission is responsible for ensuring that an ECJ judgment finding an infringement 
of EU law 65 is complied with. If the Commission considers that the Member State concerned 
has not taken the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the ECJ, it may bring the 
case before the Court. In doing so, it is to specify the amount of the lump sum or penalty 
payment to be paid by the Member State concerned which it considers appropriate in the 
circumstances. 66 Furthermore, if a national court fails to comply with its obligation to follow an 
                                               
59 Eyal Benvenisti and George W Downs, ‘Prospects for the Increased Independence of International Tribunals’ 
(2011) 12 German Law Journal 1057, 1060 et seq., 1073 et seq. 
60 Note, however, that the WTO Dispute Settlement System also has jurisdiction over the EU. 
61 E.g. in the framework of the WTO Dispute Settlement System, see Van den Bossche (n 11). 
62 Michael Zürn, ‘From Interdependence to Globalization’, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A Simmons 
(eds) Handbook of International Relations (Sage Publications, 2007) 247. 
63 See Couvreur (n 12). 
64 See Van den Bossche (n 11). 
65 See subsection 6.2 below. 
66 Art 260(2) TFEU. See Koen Lenaerts, Ignace Maselis and Kathleen Gutman (Janek Tomasz Nowak ed.), EU 
Procedural Law (OUP 2014) 208-214. 
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ECJ judgment giving a preliminary ruling, 67 infringement proceedings may be brought against 
that Member State. 68 
In addition, international courts generally do not enjoy financial autonomy – on the contrary, they 
are largely dependent on the financing through the Member States.69 Some courts have found 
themselves to be in comfortable positions, such as the ICTY and the ICTR, which are funded 
from the UN Peacekeeping budget and consequently enjoy comparative financial security.70 
Other courts, such as the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), have to rely wholly or partially on 
voluntary contributions.71  
Finally, the Member States formally retain the power to withdraw from an international court or 
tribunal, to dissolve it or to change its mandate. While this may indicate that the States 
ultimately remain above the courts, withdrawal will mean in many cases that the State will also 
have to withdraw altogether from the international organization in which the court is embedded. 
The costs of leaving, for example, the WTO, the EU or the Council of Europe will in most cases 
be too high to consider withdrawal from the respective judicial bodies as a valid option. 
Dissolving or renegotiating necessitates political consensus on the part of all Member States, 
which will often be impossible to achieve. Although the Member States remain the masters of 
the international instrument that constituted the international court, their power may exist rather 
in theory than in practice – depending on the individual benefits and the political framework of 
the respective court. 
While a clear-cut distinction between international and supranational courts is therefore 
impossible, they can be situated on a sliding scale from internationalism to supranationalism, 
based on the extent to which they match the above-mentioned criteria. Some scholars have 
doubted the usefulness of the concept of supranationalism;72 others have rejected it 
altogether.73 Nevertheless, while the concept is ill-suited to characterize an international 
organization in toto, it arguably has some value in highlighting particular characteristics in a 
certain body that indicate the extent to which it can validly be considered to be supra its Member 
States. 
4. THE CONCEPT OF THE RULE OF LAW 
4.1 POINT OF DEPARTURE 
The rule of law has been variously described as an ‘essentially contested concept’, 74 a ‘bit of 
ruling class chatter’, 75 or a ‘hurrah word’, 76 and indeed ‘remains contested across both time 
                                               
67 Art 267 TFEU. See subsections 6.2 and 6.4 below. 
68 Arts 258–260 TFEU. See Lenaerts, Maselis and Gutman (n 66) 244; and see subsection 6.2 below. 
69 Alain Pellet, ‘The Anatomy of Courts and Tribunals’ (2008) 7 The Law and Practice of International Courts and 
Tribunals 275, 286. 
70 Romano (n 3) 273. 
71 See Agreement between the United Nations and the Lebanese Republic on the establishment of a Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon (adopted 22 January 2007 and 6 February 2007, entered into force 10 June 2007) (STL Agreement) art 
5, according to which 51% of the budget is to be borne by voluntary contributions of states and 49% of the budget by 
the Lebanese Government. 
72 Klabbers (n 56) 24. 
73 See Schermers and Blokker (n 5) 57, para 62 fn 236 for references to critical authors. 
74 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (In Florida)?’ (2002) 21 Law and 
Philosophy 137-164, referring to Richard Fallon, ‘“The Rule of Law” as a concept in Constitutional Discourse’ (1997) 
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and geography’.77 This paper acknowledges those contestations and contradictions, but 
nevertheless takes as a point of departure for its enquiry the link between the national and 
international judiciary and the rule of law as highlighted in the 2012 Declaration.78 There, the 
UNGA recognized that the rule of law applies to all States equally, and to international 
organizations, including the United Nations and its principal organs, and that respect for and 
promotion of the rule of law and justice should guide all of their activities and accord 
predictability and legitimacy to their actions.79 The 2012 Declaration affirms that the 
independence of the judicial system, together with its impartiality and integrity, is an essential 
prerequisite for upholding the rule of law and ensuring that there is no discrimination in the 
administration of justice, and emphasizes the right of equal access to justice for all, including 
members of vulnerable groups.80 The 2012 Declaration also commits to ensuring that impunity 
is not tolerated for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity or for violations of 
international humanitarian law and gross violations of human rights law, and that such violations 
are properly investigated and appropriately sanctioned, including by bringing the perpetrators of 
any crimes to justice, through national mechanisms or, where appropriate, regional or 
international mechanisms, and explicitly recognizes the role of the ICC in a multilateral system 
that aims to end impunity and establish the rule of law. 81 Finally, the 2012 Declaration also 
recognizes the positive contribution of the ICJ, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, 
including in adjudicating disputes among States, and the value of its work for the promotion of 
the rule of law, and indeed the contributions of the ITLOS, as well as other international courts 
and tribunals, in advancing the rule of law at the international and national levels.82  
This paper proceeds on the working assumption that, at its most basic, the rule of law can 
arguably be described as a principle that all individuals and entities, including states and 
international organizations, are to be subject to and accountable to the law. 83 That implies the 
subjection of individuals and all levels of public power in the national and international realm to 
legal constraints with a view to guaranteeing the equal protection of all individuals against 
                                                                                                                                                       
97 Columbia L Rev 6, citing Walter Bryce Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’ (1955–1956) 56 Proceedings of 
the Aristotelian Society 167. 
75 Judith Shklar, ‘Political Theory and the Rule of Law’ in Alan Hutchinson and Patrick Monahan (eds) The Rule of 
Law: Ideal or Ideology (Carswell 1987) 1: ‘It would not be very difficult to show that the phrase “the Rule of Law” has 
become meaningless thanks to ideological abuse and general over-use . . . No intellectual effort need therefore be 
wasted on this bit of ruling-class chatter’. 
76 Stéphane Beaulac, ‘The Rule of Law in International Law Today’ in Gianluigi Palombella and Neil Walker (eds) 
Relocating the Rule of Law (Hart Publishing 2009) 222-223, who argues that ‘the rule of law’ is a formulation of 
‘Hurrah!’ words, i.e. words that provoke a positive emotion as used by Charles Kay Ogden and Ivor Armstrong 
Richards, The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of the Influence of Language upon Thought and of the Science of 
Symbolism (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1923). 
77 Simon Chesterman, ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (2008) 56 AJCL 340. 
78 UN Doc A/RES/67/1. 
79 ibid, para 2. 
80 ibid, paras 13-14. 
81 ibid, paras 22-23. 
82 ibid, paras 31-32. 
83 That core aspect is expressed cogently and concisely in Thomas Fuller’s phrase ‘Be you never so high, the Law is 
above you’: Thomas Fuller, Gnomologia: Adagies and Proverbs; Wise Sentences and Witty Sayings, Ancient and 
Modern, Foreign and British (Barker and Bettesworth and Hitch 1732) sentence no 943, quoted by Lord Denning MR 
in Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1977] QB 729, 762, and by Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (Allen Lane 
2010) 4. See further Geert De Baere, ‘European Integration and the Rule of Law in Foreign Policy’ in Julie Dickson 
and Pavlos Eleftheriadis (eds), Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law (OUP 2012) 354-383, arguing that 
that principle as applied to public authorities, particularly those involved in foreign policy, is the cornerstone of 
European integration. 
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arbitrary or unlawful use of power.84 That also entails a number of minimal characteristics, such 
as that law must be prospective, public, general, clear, stable, certain and applied to everyone 
equally according to its terms.85 As Follesdal notes,86 at least part of the justification of those 
characteristics can be based on two interests of individuals: our interest in non-domination, that 
is the ‘protection from the arbitrary use of political authority and coercive power’,87 and in 
predictability, that is ‘our ability to make longer term plans in pursuit of our various interests with 
some expectation of success – in particular, to be able to rely on general compliance with legal 
rules’.88 That leaves room for various more or less formal or substantive conceptions of the rule 
of law that are more or less expansive in what they encompass.   
A notable maximalist or substantive conception of the rule of law was put forward by UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his 2004 report The rule of law and transitional justice in 
conflict and post-conflict societies: 89 
The “rule of law” is a concept at the very heart of the Organization’s mission. It refers to a principle of 
governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are 
accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and 
which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to 
ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, 
fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, 
avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency. 
As Crawford notes, these precepts were articulated in the context of an international 
organization with international legal personality and a mandate to support domestic transitional 
justice. They arguably require adaptation before they can be applied to the system of 
international law as a whole. 90 Moreover, even at the UN level, contrasting conceptions of the 
rule of law exist, notably on whether human rights are included in the rule of law, or 
alternatively, whether they are a necessary complement of the rule of law, but not included in it. 
As pointed out by Follesdal, 91 the latter is what the 2012 Declaration appears to suggest. 
There, the Heads of State and Government, and heads of delegation reaffirm 
…that human rights, the rule of law and democracy are interlinked and mutually reinforcing and that they 
belong to the universal and indivisible core values and principles of the United Nations.92 
They also express their conviction  
                                               
84 Compare the similar conception in Chesterman (n 77) 342; and James Crawford, ‘Chance, Order, Change: The 
Course of International Law. General Course on Public International Law’ (2013) 265 Collected Courses of The 
Hague Academy of International Law 271. 
85 Brian Tamanaha, ‘A Concise Guide to the Rule of Law’ in Gianluigi Palombella and Neil Walker (eds) Relocating 
the Rule of Law (Hart Publishing 2009) 3. See also the eight desiderata in Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (Revised 
edn, Yale UP 1969) 38-39; the eight desiderata in John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 
270-271; and the eight principles in Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (2nd edn, OUP 2009) 214-219; and compare 
the definition of the rule of law in Friedrich Von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Routledge 1944) 54. See also the 
somewhat different list of features ‘arguably necessary if the international legal system can be said to be governed by 
the rule of law’ in Crawford (n 84) 253. 
86 See Follesdal (n 4). 
87 P Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Clarendon Press 1997). 
88 See Raz (n 85). 
89 UN Security Council, The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies. Report of the 
Secretary-General (UN Doc S/2004/616) para 6. 
90 Crawford (n 84) 262. 
91 Follesdal (n 4). 
92 UN Doc A/RES/67/1, para 5. 
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…that the advancement of the rule of law at the national and international levels is essential for sustained 
and inclusive economic growth, sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and hunger and the full 
realization of all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to development, all of which in 
turn reinforce the rule of law… 93 
Finally, the Heads of State and Government, and heads of delegation emphasize 
the importance of continuing our consideration and promotion of the rule of law in all its aspects, and to that 
end we decide to pursue our work in the General Assembly to develop further the linkages between the rule 
of law and the three main pillars of the United Nations: peace and security, human rights and 
development… 94 
This paper is not intended as a further examination of the merits or demerits of formal or 
substantive rule of law conceptions 95 or of more or less comprehensive conceptions including 
or not the respect for human rights. It aims to do no more than set out an analytical framework 
to assess the contribution of international and supranational courts to the rule of law at 
international, regional, and domestic levels, while leaving room for various institutional and 
individual conceptions in that regard. 
 
4.2 THE RULE OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 
The rule of law (or its equivalents in other languages) was originally developed to be applied to 
and within states, 96 as a glance at the names of the equivalent (though not entirely identical) 
concepts in a number of other languages makes clear. 97 Does the origin of the rule of law in a 
national context imply that it is, as Crawford asks, ‘still extraneous to the real hard business of 
international law, like an accidental tourist at a diplomatic conference?’98 That is clearly not a 
forgone conclusion.  In fact, the ‘domestic’ origin does not seem to stand in the way of the 
application of the rule of law, in its core meaning, to other entities, both at national and 
international levels.99 Arguably, there can be no clear-cut distinction between the state and other 
public or quasi-public bodies from the perspective of the elimination of arbitrary power. 100 As 
the ICJ put it in ELSI: ‘Arbitrariness is not so much something opposed to a rule of law, as 
something opposed to the rule of law’.101 
                                               
93 Ibid, para 7. 
94 Ibid, para 41. 
95 See further Paul Craig, ‘Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework’ [1997] 
PL 467-487; an eminent example of the former is Raz (n 85), and of the latter Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 
(Harvard UP 1985) 11-12. See specifically with respect to the international level: Hans Corell, ‘A Challenge to the 
United Nations and the World: Developing the Rule of law’ (2004) 18 Temple International and Comparative Law 
Journal 391, 393. 
96 The phrase ‘rule of law’ itself originates from Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution (6th edn, Macmillan 1902). 
97 Eg Rechtsstaat, Etat de droit, Stato di diritto, Estado de derecho. 
98 Crawford (n 84) 257. 
99 See in that sense UN General Assembly and Security Council, Uniting our strengths: Enhancing United Nations 
support for the rule of law. Report of the Secretary-General (UN Doc A/61/636–S/2006/980). 
100 See Trevor Allan, Constitutional Justice: a Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (OUP 2001) 11. 
101 ICJ, Elettronica Sicula SpA (Elsi), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1989, 76, para 128, referring to what it had held in the 
Asylum case, when it spoke of ‘arbitrary action’ being ‘substituted for the rule of law’ (ICJ, Asylum, Judgment, ICJ 
Reports 1950, p 284). 
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That said, the manner in which the rule of law is applied to international institutions and the 
international legal order in general needs to take into account the fact that, compared to most 
states, the international legal order has a varying but generally weaker degree of 
institutionalisation, lacks a centralised and hierarchical structure, and is hence organized along 
horizontal rather than vertical lines.102 That also implies the correlative need for many decisions 
to be taken by consensus, if at all.103 As will be seen, the absence of a central legislature in the 
international legal order also impacts on the role and the operation of international and 
supranational courts.104 
Furthermore, account must be taken of the divergent meanings given to the equivalent concepts 
in various systems, especially as failing to take account of local traditions may be a major 
stumbling block in promoting the rule of law.105 Much like with respect to human rights, a 
consensus on the rule of law cannot be achieved by ignoring pre-existing traditions, but by 
different groups, within their own heritage, ‘travelling different routes to the same goal.’106 The 
importance of that diversity is also acknowledged by the United Nations, notably in the 2008 
Report of the Secretary General and in the 2012 Declaration. In his 2008 Report, the Secretary-
General argued that in fulfilling its responsibilities, the UN must work towards achieving 
appropriate application at the international level of the Organization’s understanding of the 
principle of the rule of law. However, efforts to do so ‘must be based on commonly agreed 
values’, which are to be drawn from existing commitments in the UN, the Declaration on 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States,107 
the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document108 and multilateral treaties.109 In the 2012 
Declaration, the Heads of State and Government, and heads of delegation recognized ‘the 
progress made by countries in advancing the rule of law as an integral part of their national 
strategies’, and ‘that there are common features founded on international norms and standards 
which are reflected in a broad diversity of national experiences in the area of the rule of law’, 
stressing ‘the importance of promoting the sharing of national practices and of inclusive 
dialogue’.110 International law does not exist to exhort or enforce a homogenous set of values at 
all costs, but in large areas allows states to be different. As Vaughan Lowe put it: ‘International 
law deals in polyphony, not in plainsong’.111 
International law constrains the unlimited exercise of power by states through subjecting their 
behaviour to a set of rules. That not only makes their behaviour compatible with similar 
behaviour of other states and actors in international law, but also makes it more predictable and 
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hence creates opportunities for individuals to act freely and autonomously.112 Rules establish 
expectations for individuals. If the bases of these rules and claims are unsure, ‘so are the 
boundaries of men’s liberties’.113 In that sense, too extensive a conferral of discretion upon 
public authorities may invite the judgement that the regime in question is a marginal instance of 
a legal ordering. If discretion is too broadly conferred, individuals will have to guide their conduct 
by prediction of official behaviour, rather than by legal rules. This also means that the rule of law 
implies independence of the power of others, and is not content with mere predictability in action 
by public authorities: ‘even when we are fully under the power of the unconstrained will of our 
governors, the exercise of that power may be highly predictable’. 114 That is true of all public 
authorities, from the local to the international level, even if international organizations do not as 
a rule aim at the monopoly of the use of force in a specific territorial circumscription.115 
Nevertheless, the risk of discretionary competences that are too broad in scope is often higher 
in the international action of states, which is traditionally the domain of the executive, with often 
little involvement of the legislature or the judiciary. For example, an international rule of 
precedence such as Article 103 of the UN Charter, which provides that in case of conflict, 
obligations under the Charter prevail over obligations under any other international agreement, 
can have the effect not of limiting the discretionary power of an essentially executive organ such 
as the Security Council, but of expanding it at the expense of rule of law constraints, democratic 
accountability, and the rights of individuals.116 The peace and security powers given to or 
asserted by the UN Security Council and the unusual relationship to other legal regimes due to 
Article 103 of the UN Charter may lead to questioning whether the UN may properly be said to 
embody the rule of law in a meaningful way.117 In short, there exists an inherent contradiction 
between the rule of law and the notion of a purely administrative or discretionary act that 
determines a citizen’s fate without recourse to legal safeguards,118 and such acts are arguably 
more common in international action than in internal action.  
Clearly therefore, an individual’s liberties are as much at stake when the state acts externally as 
when it acts internally. Indeed, many more individuals may be affected by the state’s external 
action than by its internal action. Moreover, lawless state action in the international realm may 
entail lawless state action at home, as abuses in the government’s treatment of others abroad 
can creep back in and insinuate themselves into domestic state practice, infecting and 
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contaminating the culture of legality at home. As Waldron put it: the ‘governmental character of 
the nation-state does not evaporate when we move up a level to the international realm’. 119 
Furthermore, the strong global interdependence causes individuals and groups often to be 
affected more readily by the actions of other states than by those of the state in which they live 
or of which they are nationals. However, the existing international legal order, subdivided as it is 
in sovereign and equal states, does not allow individuals to be included in decision-making 
processes that cover competences of other states or political communities, but the outcome of 
which will nevertheless affect their life and wellbeing. 120 
Governments should therefore proceed on the basis that they are to act both internally and 
externally in accordance with law in all of their operations, and thus subject themselves to 
constraint by law so that citizens can enjoy freedom under law.121 That idea is reflected in Article 
14 of the Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States:122 
Every State has the duty to conduct its relations with other States in accordance with international law and 
with the principle that the sovereignty of each State is subject to the supremacy of international law. 
Depending on the sources of rule of law constraints and the public authorities to which they 
apply, a distinction could in that regard be drawn between an external and an internal aspect of 
the rule of law. 123 The sources of external rule of law constraints are legal orders that include 
but are broader in scope than the legal order whose public authorities they are meant to 
constrain; for example, constraints on states imposed by an international organization of which 
they are a member, but equally constraints on international organizations imposed by general 
international law. The sources of internal rule of law constraints are the legal orders themselves 
whose public authorities are to be constrained; for example, constraints imposed by the internal 
law of those states or international organizations. In both cases, those constraints can pertain to 
public authority action within the legal order; that is, internal or (for states) domestic policy, and 
public authority action outside the legal order; that is, external or (for states) foreign policy. An 
example of an external rule of law constraint on foreign policy is the prohibition on the threat or 
use of force in international relations contained in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. An example of 
an external rule of law constraint on internal or domestic policy is the right not to be subjected to 
torture as guaranteed by Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). An 
example of an internal rule of law constraint to external or foreign policy would be the possibility 
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for courts to review the compliance of an international agreement with internal constitutional 
principles. An example of an internal rule of law constraint to internal or domestic policy would 
be the possibility for courts to review the legality of police action by a state on its own territory. 
As will be explored further below, 124 by assessing the compliance by public authorities with 
international law constraints, international and supranational courts can contribute to internal 
rule of law constraints within the organizations of which they are an organ (internal compliance 
assessment), as well as to the external rule of law constraints on states subject to their 
jurisdiction (external compliance assessment). In turn, those external rule of law constraints 
imposed by international and supranational courts may contribute to the internal rule of law 
constraints on states imposed by their own courts or administrations. 
For states, rule of law constraints may be regarded as limiting their freedom of action. 125 It has 
been often argued that in an unpredictable world states must not be constrained by rules that 
prevent them from acting quickly and decisively.126 States may well take the view that they can 
only allow themselves to be so constrained if the behaviour of other international actors can be 
predicted because it is governed by rules. That is arguably why foreign policy has frequently 
been claimed to escape any grasp of law.127 On the internal level, it is often held that the 
penetration of law into foreign policy should be kept to a minimum: the executive must have its 
hands free to react to international developments quickly and effectively, without interference 
from the legislature or the judiciary.128 On the international level, a similar attitude has 
sometimes led to the rejection of the legal character of international law,129 or the downplaying 
of its significance.130 
Conversely, international law can nevertheless often also be actively used by states to achieve 
particular objectives that they find difficult to achieve using purely internal means. 131 It can, for 
example be used to entrench rules that are not easily subject to entrenchment by ordinary 
statute.132 Indeed, politicians may even use international courts or other independent dispute 
settlement organs instead of bilateral negotiations so as to avoid the political costs of 
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negotiating a deal that may be not as attractive to their constituents as other options.133 
Moreover, states often do regard themselves bound by certain constraints regardless of whether 
other international actors are so constrained. For example, many states would hold themselves 
bound by an obligation not to torture prisoners, regardless of whether other states or 
international actors are under the same obligation.134  
Crucially, international courts provide an important method for states to bind themselves without 
the danger of facing an ‘unbound’ opponent. Conferring jurisdiction, especially compulsory 
jurisdiction, to an international court is a tool for states to bind other states and to create the 
background conditions for the law to be implemented and respected by all parties. 135 In other 
words, accepting the jurisdiction of international courts makes the mutual commitments between 
states credible, which may provide an incentive for their creation. 136 In addition, while under a 
contract-based conception of international obligations, the breach by one party of its obligations 
releases or modifies the obligations of the other party, international law has arguably seen a 
shift toward expectations of compliance grounded in the rule of law, regardless of what other 
parties may be doing. That shift is most visible in the operation of international courts.137  
4.3 THE RULE OF LAW AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
As noted by Waldron, principles (such as the rule of law) ‘cannot conduct distributions by 
themselves: they must be administered by working institutions’, and ‘to the extent that the 
avoidance of injustice is a moral imperative, the establishment of coordinating institutions is a 
moral imperative’.138 The establishment of international and supranational courts is to be 
understood against that background.139  
The possibility of access to an independent judiciary and of judicial review is an essential aspect 
in many understandings of the rule of law.140 The judiciary’s crucial role of preventing 
discrepancy between the law as declared and as administered,141 ensuring that legal rules 
prevail over power in the settlement of disputes,142 and rendering the law clearer, more 
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predictable, and more coherent, makes international and supranational courts a logical focal 
point for a discussion of the rule of law at the international, regional and national levels.143  
For Hans Kelsen, the judicial process is the foundation of each legal organisation and every 
community of law, and the introduction of a judicial organ with compulsory jurisdiction is the 
turning point in the transition from a decentralized legal order to a more centralized and more 
effective legal order.144 In the international legal order, that process is still in its infancy, as 
judicial dispute settlement remains an exception to the rule of autonomous interpretation by 
states of their international obligations and free choice of means of peaceful dispute 
settlement.145 Indeed, Grotius felt perfectly comfortable putting forward the idea of an 
international legal order based on rights, duties, and rules of conduct, but without courts.146 
Nevertheless, as Alter has powerfully demonstrated, international courts play an ever-increasing 
central role in the debate about the meaning of international law and about what respect for the 
rule of law by governments entails. Their contribution rests in their independent ability to state 
what the law is, point out violations, indicate remedies, and increase the credibility of the 
consequences of non-compliance with international rules. They further effectuate change by 
working with actors in various guises and combinations that for various reasons want to see 
international law respected. 147  
International courts and tribunals adjudicate disputes not on the basis of political discretion, but 
on the basis of previously established rules.148 They thus contribute to a situation in which not 
physical force and the arbitrariness and oppressiveness of power contests but a system of rules 
is the manner in which disputes are to be settled, thereby representing the normative ideal of 
the rule of law.149 Nevertheless, international courts not only settle disputes, but especially in the 
absence of an international legislature, also contribute to the development of the law.150 Indeed, 
dispute settlement may currently no longer be the task most often given to an international 
court, nor its most often performed function.151 
The diversity of the contexts in which the rule of law at international level operates mentioned 
above also has clear consequences for the operation of courts. While domestic courts work 
against the background of a shared minimum set of common values, such commonality is often 
very thin in the international legal order. International courts and tribunals are therefore faced 
with a fraught balancing act between different legal and moral systems.152 Indeed, the key 
difference between national and international law in that regard may be that the latter must 
compete with domestic rule of law conceptions. Governments may therefore try to justify their 
disregard for decisions of international courts and tribunals by arguing that they are inconsistent 
with the domestic conception of the rule of law.153 Moreover, and partly as a consequence, the 
                                               
143 See De Baere (n 83) 367-368. 
144 Hans Kelsen, Peace Through Law (The University of North Carolina Press 1944) 73. See Charles Leben, ‘Hans 
Kelsen and the Advancement of International Law’ (1998) 9 EJIL 287, 291-292. Further: Jochen von Bernstorff, The 
Public International Law Theory of Hans Kelsen: Believing in Universal Law (CUP 2010) 191-224. 
145 See art 33 UN Charter. Further Andreas Paulus, ‘International Adjudication’ in Samantha Besson and John 
Tasioulas (eds) The Philosophy of International Law (OUP 2010) 207. 
146 As pointed out by Kingsbury (n 133) 203, referring to Hugo Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis (1625). 
147 Alter (n 5) 4-5 and 28. 
148 Paulus (n 145) 217-219. 
149 Hachez (n 142) 308. 
150 Lowe (n 111) 212-214. 
151 Alter (n 5) 12-13. See section 6 below. 
152 Paulus (n 145) 213. 
153 Alter (n 5) 8 and 20. 
24 
 
difficulties for international courts and tribunals start at the level of sources, which are 
notoriously more difficult to identify than in domestic legal systems. In the absence of an 
international legislator, a consequence of what Dworkin described as the ‘unmitigated 
Westphalian system’,154 international judges must find the law before being able to apply it.155 
The political context within which international courts and tribunals operate is therefore of crucial 
importance in order to understand their functioning.  
5. INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY 
International courts and tribunals do not exist in a vacuum. They operate in a politico-legal 
framework formed by international institutions and Member States. It is particularly the 
relationship with the latter that has raised concerns. Why would states voluntarily create 
international adjudicative bodies and submit to their jurisdiction? What means of control do they 
retain? Different models have been applied to capture this phenomenon.156 Proponents of the 
Principal-Agent theory, for example, posit that courts and tribunals are mere agents of their 
Member States, susceptible to political sanctions and threats thereof. The Member States can 
renegotiate the mandate of the courts or threaten to do so in order to ensure compliance with 
their own preferences. Others see courts as trustees of their Member States – independent but 
nevertheless subject to political influence.157 In particular, Member States might use ‘rhetorical 
politics’ to impact on a court’s reasoning, they may delegitimize a court, or disband it altogether. 
Whereas Posner and Yoo consider the fragmentation of international courts as a consequence 
and proof of the states’ desire to retain control,158 Slaughter and Helfer argue that international 
courts only enjoy ‘constrained independence’, meaning that they are formally independent but in 
fact controlled by their Member States through a ‘range of structural, political, and discursive 
mechanisms’.159 Regardless of the label, it appears that a certain degree of political influence 
may often exist and should not be ignored. 
This political influence risks undermining the contribution of international courts and tribunals to 
the rule of law. Independence and impartiality are the basic criteria for any court and tribunal 
that aspires to enjoy even a minimal degree of legitimacy, respect and confidence and to fulfil 
effectively the various roles with which it has been mandated.160 They are the sine qua non for 
any judicial contribution to the rule of law.161 Courts must be free from any form of external 
pressure – be it from the parties of the case, the states parties to the instrument establishing the 
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court, the country hosting the seat of the court, or the international organization of which the 
court forms a part (independence). Judges need to base their decisions on the relevant facts 
and the applicable law, rather than on their own preferences (impartiality).162 These criteria 
constitute basic requirements for a court’s effective contribution to the rule of law. 
Independence and impartiality are values that need to be internalized by international judges 
and they must constantly guide their actions on the court. They need to ‘reign the spirits and the 
hearts’ of the judiciary.163 In addition, the institutional framework of the international adjudicative 
bodies needs to provide sufficient room for the exercise of the judicial function in line with these 
values, which particularly means that judges must be shielded from any form of external 
pressure. All of the statutes and rules of procedures of the selected courts164 contain safeguards 
to ensure the independence and impartiality of the respective judicial body. They provide for 
appointment procedures designed to ensure the independence of the judges from external 
influences, list the independence of the candidate as one of the basic eligibility criteria, they 
contain provisions on incompatibility, on the nationality of the judges, on their privileges and 
immunities, on their irremovability and remuneration, on the secrecy of deliberations and votes 
and lastly on the terms of office. The following subsections give a brief comparative overview of 
these formal safeguards. 
5.1 ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA 
The independence and impartiality of the candidate is an eligibility criterion that can be found in 
the governing texts of all selected courts and tribunals.165 Judges and Advocates General of the 
CJEU ‘shall be chosen from persons whose independence is beyond doubt’,166 the judges of the 
ICC and ICTY must distinguish themselves by their ‘impartiality and integrity’,167 the ICJ is to be 
‘composed of a body of independent judges’168 and the judges of the ITLOS are required to 
enjoy the ‘highest reputation for fairness and integrity’.169 The Statute of the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon is even more explicit on this issue. It provides not only that the judges be persons of 
‘impartiality and integrity’, but also that they must be ‘independent in the performance of their 
functions and shall not accept or seek instructions from any Government or any other source’.170 
With respect to the ECtHR, Article 21(1) ECHR does not explicitly list the independence or 
impartiality of the judges as an eligibility criterion, and only refers to their ‘high moral character’. 
Nevertheless, Article 21(3) ECHR obliges judges to refrain from ‘any activity which is 
incompatible with their independence [or] impartiality’. Finally, the Members of the WTO AB are 
required by the Rules of Conduct to be ‘independent and impartial’ and to ‘avoid direct or 
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indirect conflicts of interest’.171 All of these provisions are kept in general terms and do not 
specify what these criteria imply. More detailed guidance is usually provided in the subsequent 
provisions of the governing texts. Nevertheless, the consistent inclusion of independence and 
impartiality in the eligibility criteria underlines their fundamental value for the international 
judiciary and ensures their central importance for the election process.  
5.2 APPOINTMENT PROCEDURE 
The appointment procedures for most of the selected courts and tribunals172 are designed in 
order to avoid undue dominance by one state or group of states. Safeguards include the 
establishment of independent national nomination bodies or panels, the involvement of multiple 
organs in the election process, and the requirement of a high quorum. Candidates for the ICJ, 
for example, need to be nominated by the PCA national groups, a group of up to four 
individuals, which are appointed by the parties of the PCA to serve as potential arbitrators.173 In 
theory, the PCA national groups are supposed to be independent from their national 
governments.174 However, in practice it is not uncommon to find active government officials 
among them,175 and it has been argued that the majority of these groups are in fact ‘extensions 
of their governments’.176 The CJEU and the ECtHR both have the safeguard of an independent 
nominations commission, which assesses the suitability of the candidates and delivers an 
opinion to the Member States before they proceed with the appointment. The panel for the 
CJEU is composed of former judges of the CJEU or the General Court, members of national 
supreme courts, and ‘lawyers of recognised competence’.177 The composition of the ECtHR 
Advisory Panel is similar, but allows for the appointment of former judges of international courts 
more generally. These non-state selection committees may be more efficient in curtailing 
national influence on the nomination process.178 
While judges of the ECtHR are selected by a simple majority in the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe,179 the ICC Statute requires a two-thirds majority of the States Parties 
present and voting,180 similar to the ITLOS Statute, where the quorum is a ‘two-thirds majority of 
the States Parties present and voting, provided that such majority includes a majority of the 
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States Parties’.181 ICJ judges need to be elected in both the UN Security Council and the UN 
General Assembly, by an absolute majority in both organs.182 The involvement of both organs is 
also required by the ICTY Statute. Here, the UN Security Council creates a list of candidates 
based on nominations of the UN Member States and observers, from which the UN General 
Assembly will then elect the permanent judges with an ‘absolute majority of the votes of the 
States Members of the United Nations and of the non-member States maintaining permanent 
observer missions at United Nations Headquarters’.183 Rather than by a majority vote, the 
judges of the CJEU are appointed ‘by common accord’ of all EU Member States.184 The only 
appointment procedure not involving elections is the one of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 
where the judges are appointed by the UN Secretary General185 following consultations with the 
Lebanese government and the recommendation of a selection panel.186 Lastly, the 
independence and impartiality of the members of the IUSCT is safeguarded by a procedure that 
reflects the character of the bilateral claims tribunal. Each government appoints one third of the 
members; the remaining third is selected by mutual agreement by the state-appointed 
members.187 While the selection process thus differs from court to court, most procedures 
display distinct democratic features and a strong merit-based approach. In all cases, the 
appointment procedure is designed in a way that aims to prohibit the dominance of one state or 
a group of states. However, whether these safeguards always achieve the intended results 
remains contested. Some have concluded that the election processes make it impossible for 
any state to exercise undue influence.188 Others have recognized the efforts ‘on paper … to 
reduce the effect of raw politics on the election process’ while pointing out the ‘reality of power 
politics’, which ensures for example at the ICJ that the permanent members of the UN Security 
Council always have a national on the bench.189  
5.3 INCOMPATIBILITY 
The governing texts of most of the selected tribunals190 contain specific provisions on 
incompatibilities. Absolute incompatibility thereby refers to functions that are incompatible with 
the position of a judge per se, while relative incompatibility refers to the ability of a judge to hear 
a particular case. 
The strictest rule is contained in the ICJ Statute which prohibits judges to exercise ‘any political 
or administrative function, or engage in any other occupation of a professional nature’191 and to 
‘act as agent, counsel or advocate in any case’.192 The corresponding provision in the PCIJ 
Statute had been interpreted more leniently, as the Court’s limited workload often allowed 
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judges to pursue other activities on the side. An activity was not permissible ‘if it interfered, even 
lightly or only potentially, with a judge’s independence or impartiality’, the mere semblance of 
incompatibility being sufficient to assume impermissibility.193 The increased workload of the ICJ 
has restricted the possibility of judges to engage in additional activities, which today leaves 
occasional appointments as an arbitrator or academic work as the only two options generally 
accepted by the ICJ.194 In a similar manner, the Statute of the CJEU provides that ‘[t]he Judges 
may not hold any political or administrative office’, and that they ‘may not engage in any 
occupation, whether gainful or not, unless exemption is exceptionally granted by the Council, 
acting by a simple majority’.195 
The ECHR makes the nexus between the absolute incompatibility of activities and the 
requirements of independence and impartiality more explicitly. It generally provides in Article 
21(3) that ‘[d]uring their term of office the judges shall not engage in any activity which is 
incompatible with their independence, impartiality or with the demands of a full-time office…’ 196 
Judges need to be transparent about their activities outside the court and any disagreements 
are to be decided by the plenary. Similarly, the ITLOS Statute provides that no member of the 
tribunal may exercise ‘any political or administrative function’, ‘associate actively with or be 
financially interested’ in enterprises who explore, exploit or otherwise commercially use the sea 
or the seabed’, or act as agent, counsel or advocate in any case’.197 
The ICC Statute not only prohibits for the judges of the ICC any ‘activity which is likely to 
interfere with their judicial functions or to affect confidence in their independence’, it also 
prohibits any other ‘occupation of a professional nature’.198 Conversely, persons serving on the 
WTO AB may engage in other professional activities, provided that they are ‘unaffiliated with 
any government’ and do ‘not participate in the consideration of any disputes that would create a 
direct or indirect conflict of interest’.199 
Most instruments also contain provisions on relative incompatibility in order to avoid conflicts of 
interest in specific cases. Incompatibilities are usually assumed if the judge (1) has personal 
interests in the case (for example family or professional ties with the parties), (2) has previously 
been involved in the case (for example as an agent, advocate, adviser or judge on another 
tribunal), (3) pursues political, administrative or professional activities incompatible with his 
independence and impartiality, or (4) publicly expressed his opinion on the case.200  
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5.4 NATIONALITY 
Several instruments contain provisions governing the situation that a judge and a party share 
the same nationality. The ICJ Statute and the ITLOS Statute, for example, explicitly provide that 
the judges/members of the nationality of any party retain their right to hear the case.201 In these 
cases, the other party may choose an ad hoc judge to sit on the respective case. Ad hoc judges 
may also be appointed in cases where neither of the parties has a judge of its own nationality on 
the bench. The possibility to appoint ad hoc judges therefore aims to bring relevant expertise to 
the bench and to increase the court’s legitimacy, while also ensuring equality between the 
parties.202 However, both the Rules of the Procedure of the ECtHR and of the ITLOS stipulate 
that the Presidency may not be exercised by a national of any party in a given case.203 Even 
though studies have found little evidence for the assumption that judges are generally more 
favourable towards the positions of their home country,204 these rules contribute to the external 
perception of an impartial and balanced body, in line with the maxim that ‘justice must not only 
be done, but be seen to be done’.205 Nationality continues to play an important role with regard 
to the composition of the bench, as evidenced by the efforts to ensure a geographic balance, 
but also by the insistence of the permanent members of the UN Security Council each to have a 
national on the ICJ.206 
5.5 PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 
An essential safeguard for the independence of a judge is the granting of privileges and 
immunities, which guarantees the judge the necessary freedom to fulfil his functions. In 
particular, it avoids pressure through politically motivated prosecutions. Most governing texts of 
the selected courts and tribunals207 contain provisions in this respect.208 While the majority of 
these provisions only grant immunity during the exercise of the judicial function, the CJEU 
Statute and the ICC Statute also grant immunity after a judge has left the court with respect to 
legal proceedings on any acts performed in the judicial capacity.209 
5.6 IRREMOVIBILITY 
Another essential tool to ensure the independence of the judges is their irremovibility from the 
bench during the period of their mandate. As for example the ICJ Statute provides: ‘No member 
of the Court can be dismissed unless, in the unanimous opinion of the other members, he has 
ceased to fulfil the required conditions’.210 Similar provisions can be found for example in the 
statutes of the CJEU, the ECtHR, the ICC and the ITLOS.211 They are intended to serve as 
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safeguards against political interference with the work of the court through the threat of 
dismissal of its members.  
5.7 REMUNERATION 
A similar motivation underlies a provision that can be found in statutes of several selected 
courts.212 In order to limit the scope of potential political pressure that may be exercised on the 
judges, these provisions stipulate that the salaries, allowances and compensation of the judges 
may not be decreased during their term of office.213 Judges can therefore not be threatened with 
financial sanctions in order to ensure a certain voting behaviour. 
5.8 SECRECY OF DELIBERATIONS AND VOTING 
It has been argued that ‘in all judicial activity, the secrecy of deliberations serves as an essential 
guarantee of the judge’s independence’.214 However, this principle is interpreted differently 
across the various legal cultures of the world. Whereas judicial deliberations and votes are 
usually confidential in the continental European tradition, common law countries are more 
familiar with the disclosure of the votes and the publication of separate (dissenting and 
concurring) opinions. The practice at the level of the international judiciary is uneven. 
Nevertheless, there are certain commonalities. 
All governing texts of the selected courts and tribunals215 protect the confidentiality of the 
judges’ deliberations, which ‘shall take place in private and remain secret’.216 Most courts and 
tribunals also protect the secrecy of voting. The ICJ and ITLOS form an exception in this 
respect. Article 125(1)(l) of the ITLOS Rules states that the judgment shall contain ‘the number 
and names of the judges constituting the majority and those constituting the minority, on each 
operative provision’. The ICJ Statute was originally silent on this issue. Until 1978, the ICJ 
rejected the publication of the voting behaviour, considering such a practice to be ‘against the 
Statute itself’.217 At the same time, however, judges were free to deliver separate opinions 
(dissenting or concurring), thus rendering the attempt to ensure secrecy rather futile. In 1978, 
the ICJ’s Rules of Procedure were amended and now list ‘the number and names of the judges 
constituting the majority’ among the elements that need to be contained in a judgment.218 The 
same issue can be observed with regard to most other international courts and tribunals. While 
for example the ECtHR, the three criminal courts and the IUSCT do not provide the names of 
the judges voting in favour or against a decision, they all permit the publication of separate 
opinions, thus allowing for inferences to be drawn on the voting behaviour.219 The CJEU is the 
only court that maintains the principle of ‘apparent unanimity’ in line with the domestic legal 
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traditions of its founding Member States:220 deliberations and votes are kept secret, and no 
separate opinions are published. Aside from domestic legal traditions, fear of individual judges 
either always defending their home state’s position or, conversely, declining to do so and hence 
being refused an additional term by their home Member State, as well as the concern that 
dissenting opinions may undermine the authority of the Court, are often cited as the main 
reasons why allowing separate opinions was not considered apposite.221 Finally, the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System aims for a compromise approach. Panel or AB members may 
publish separate opinions, but they must be anonymous.222 However, critics have argued that 
this attempt to safeguard the independence of the panel or AB members is in practice not very 
effective, given that the name of the dissenter will often be easily identified by those familiar with 
the case.223  
The picture is therefore mixed, ranging from complete confidentiality of the judges’ deliberations 
and votes to disclosure of voting behaviour and publication of separate opinions. This can have 
implications for the degree of outside pressure that a judge may receive or perceive. 
5.9 TERM OF OFFICE 
Schermers and Blokker identify the length of the term of office as a safeguard for judicial 
independence in the sense that a longer term equals more independence.224 In contrast to 
judges on national courts, international judges are as a rule not appointed for life or until 
retirement but for limited periods of time, and may or may not be reappointed, depending on the 
institutional framework. This practice was established with the first international courts and 
tribunals in the beginning of the twentieth century225 and maintained in the Statute of the PCIJ. 
The Advisory Committee of Jurists, which drafted the PCIJ’s Statute, considered a proposal by 
Sweden to appoint the judges of the PCIJ for life but opted for a term of nine years with the 
possibility of re-election instead. It reasoned that the term should be long enough to create an 
‘esprit de corps’, that re-election should be possible in order to reward ‘faithful and efficient 
service’ but that judges should not be appointed for life in order to preserve the possibility to 
replace those judges who ‘failed to justify their election’.226 With the exception of the IUSCT, 227 
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the selected courts and tribunals228 all follow this model. The length of the terms of office range 
from nine years (ICJ, ITLOS, ECtHR and ICC) to six (CJEU), four (WTO AB, ICTY) and three 
years (Special Tribunal for Lebanon).229 Re-election is permitted by all courts except for the 
ECtHR and the ICC. The WTO AB limits the number of re-elections to one. 
This practice appears to have been widely accepted. It should however not be overlooked, that 
the fixed-term mandates of judges and the possibility of re-election may negatively impact on 
the independence and impartiality of judges. First, the opportunity of re-election can create 
incentives for judges to avoid decisions that might run contrary to the positions of influential 
Member States.230 The mere existence of such incentive can be enough to cast doubt on their 
independence and impartiality, even if it does not in fact influence the motivation of the judge. 
Second, the re-election process provides a possibility for states to sanction unwelcome actions 
and thus to exercise political pressure. 231  
It would therefore arguably be more conducive to the independence and impartiality of the 
judges if international courts and tribunals opted for non-renewable long-term mandates instead 
of the current practice.232 The solution adopted in the ECtHR could be considered a best 
practice in that regard. 
5.10 INTERIM CONCLUSIONS 
The selected courts and tribunals233 have been equipped with a range of safeguards against 
most forms of political interference. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether these formal institutional 
rules can ever be sufficient. In the end, the Member States retain control over the delegated 
powers of the international court or tribunal and they can sanction the judicial body by 
renegotiating the foundational instrument on which the court or tribunal is based – even if that 
may only be a ‘nuclear option’.234 It is therefore important always to consider the broader 
politico-legal context in which international courts and tribunals operate. Besides all formal 
safeguards and the personal integrity of the judges, a high degree of intra- and interstate 
political competition between the courts’ States, as well as a high degree of discrepancy in their 
policies remains the most important safeguard of a court’s independence.235 It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to assess the various political forces that influence the different courts and 
tribunals.236 Nevertheless, the broader politico-legal framework must not be overlooked when 
dealing with the question of international judicial independence.  
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6. AN OVERVIEW OF THE CONTRIBUTION OF INTERNATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL COURTS TO THE 
RULE OF LAW 
This paper adopted as a working assumption that, at its most basic, the rule of law can be 
described as a principle that all individuals and entities, including states and international 
organizations, are to be subject to and accountable to the law. That implies the subjection of 
individuals and all levels of public power in the national and international realm to legal 
constraints with a view to guaranteeing the equal protection of all individuals against its arbitrary 
or unlawful use of power. 237 
As explored above, international courts no longer solely fulfil the role of dispute settlers, but 
have taken on new functions.238 Alter lists criminal enforcement and infringement proceedings, 
dispute resolution as well as administrative and constitutional review as the four ideal types of 
judicial functions. Von Bogdandy and Venzke additionally consider the international judiciary to 
have a law-making function239, while Shelton adds the provision of ‘legal advice’.240 Arguably, 
therefore, international and supranational courts can contribute to the rule of law through 
dispute settlement (6.1) and compliance assessment (6.2), the tackling of impunity (6.3), as well 
as through the clarification and development of international law (6.4). These (partially 
overlapping) functions may be considered direct contributions. Indirectly, international courts 
may, by fulfilling these functions, contribute to the socialization of states to the concept of the 
rule of law at the international level and to its growing importance in international relations.241 
6.1 DISPUTE SETTLEMENT  
Dispute settlement is the traditional domain of international courts and also the role that most of 
the selected international courts and tribunals242 have been allocated by their Member States. 
By peacefully settling disputes on the basis of law, the adjudicator ideally takes away sources of 
tension between the parties and ensures that it is not political or economic power that decides 
over the outcome of a dispute, but the law (‘right over might’), thereby avoiding arbitrariness and 
contributing to the equal protection of individuals.  
Dispute settlement is the core competence of the ICJ, the ITLOS, the WTO Dispute Settlement 
System and the IUSCT. The ICJ is explicitly mandated with the settlement of disputes243, and 
has at the time of writing rendered 116 judgments,244 the majority of which since the 1990s. 
Similarly, the ITLOS has been tasked to ‘deal with disputes arising out of the Convention’.245 So 
far, 22 contentious cases have been submitted to the Tribunal. However, both courts have 
received far less cases than the WTO Dispute Settlement System, which – with 188 panel 
reports and 110 appellate reports – is the most prolific state-to-state dispute settlement body.246 
The ‘prompt settlement’ of disputes is the principal objective of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
System and considered ‘essential to the functioning of the WTO’.247 Conversely, the IUSCT 
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does not only have jurisdiction over state-to-state disputes (contractual claims of the United 
States and Iran against each other) but also over claims of nationals of either state against the 
other. It has received a total of 3953 claims of which only 16 remain on the tribunal’s docket 
today.  
The increasing recourse to international dispute settlement might suggest that these 
international courts and tribunals enjoy legitimacy and inspire the necessary confidence that 
motivates parties to turn towards them for fair and just dispute settlement.248 The settlement of 
disputes by legal means can in itself be considered an important contribution to the rule of law. 
However, critics point to the fact that only a small percentage of international disputes make it 
onto the docket of an international court or tribunal249, particularly if the case touches upon 
politically sensitive issues.250 It has, for example, been argued that the ICJ has so far mostly 
dealt with rather uncontroversial cases on boundary delimitations and treaty interpretation.251 
The majority of international disputes never make it to a judge’s desk. Furthermore, it has been 
pointed out that dispute settlement before an international court or tribunal requires money and 
expertise, and may thus not be accessible to poorer countries.252 In particular, the judicialization 
of the WTO as opposed to the GATT regime and the disappearance of developing countries 
from the Dispute Settlement System’s docket has been cited as illustrating the increasing 
hurdles these countries face.253 However, this is countered by Van den Bossche, who not only 
sees no disparity in terms of numbers between developed and developing countries in the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System254 but also refers to the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL), 
which provides low cost or pro bono legal services to developing country WTO Members.255  
Through dispute settlement – their oldest and most uncontroversial256 function – international 
courts and tribunals make a significant contribution to the rule of law. Nevertheless, other 
functions, such as the clarification of international law and compliance assessment, may in the 
meantime have come to rival it in terms of importance. 
6.2. COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT 
As mentioned above, compliance assessment is a primary tool to subject public power to the 
constraints of international law and to protect the rights of individuals. External compliance 
assessment entails the control exercised by international courts and tribunals over the acts of 
domestic authorities. Internal compliance assessment involves the judicial control over the acts 
of the international organisation of which they are organs. In that sense this paper uses the term 
‘compliance assessment’ flexibly, encompassing Alter’s categories of ‘enforcement’, 
‘administrative review’ and ‘constitutional review’,257 in line with von Bogdandy’s and Venzke’s 
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concept of ‘controlling and legitimating public authority’.258 Compliance assessment can thus be 
exercised by every international court and tribunal mandated to rule on the compliance of a 
public authority with international law. It can be exercised to different degrees: external 
compliance assessment is generally limited to declaring an action by public authorities non-
compliant with international law or to awarding remedies, while internal compliance assessment 
may imply the authority to invalidate the non-compliant act.  
Illustrative of external compliance assessment are the powers exercised by the ECtHR, the 
WTO Dispute Settlement System and the CJEU, when they review the compliance of domestic 
authorities with the ECHR, WTO Law or EU law. The ECtHR has been created to ‘ensure the 
observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention 
and the Protocols thereto’.259 Where it receives applications from States Parties260 or 
individuals261 alleging a breach of the applicable law, the Court may decide on whether or not a 
violation exists, and authorize remedies. Similarly, the WTO Dispute Settlement System 
receives applications from other WTO Members alleging violations of the WTO Agreements. 
The CJEU has jurisdiction with respect to actions brought against a Member State for its failure 
to fulfil its obligations under the Treaties pursuant Articles 258–260 TFEU (‘infringement 
proceedings’), as well as with respect to preliminary ruling procedures in relation to the 
interpretation of Union law under Article 267 TFEU, which indirectly concern the compatibility of 
national law with Union law. None of these bodies has the competence to invalidate a non-
compliant domestic law. 262  
Illustrative of internal compliance assessment are the judicial review by the CJEU of acts or 
failures to act of the Union institutions.263 In that regard, the Court held in Les Verts that the 
Community, now the Union is, ‘based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Member States 
nor its institutions can avoid a review of the question whether the measures adopted by them 
are in conformity with the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty’.264 Nevertheless, international 
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courts or tribunals typically lack jurisdiction to adjudicate issues concerning the conduct of the 
organisations of which they are a part. 265 The WTO AB is a clear example of that 
phenomenon. 266 Furthermore, it remains contested whether the ICJ has any jurisdiction to 
review the legality of UN Security Council resolutions.267 The issue was raised in the context of 
the Lockerbie case, which was withdrawn before the ICJ could render its final decision on the 
matter.268 
While the contributions of the international judiciary to the rule of law are remarkable in this 
respect, it is also apparent that the rule of law is still weaker at the international level than at the 
regional and national level. There is a considerable lower degree of judicial control exercised 
over the activities of international actors, resulting in a comparatively weaker system of checks 
and balances.  
6.3 TACKLING OF IMPUNITY 
As argued above, the rule of law requires that legal constraints bind not only all levels of public 
power but also individuals. Consequently, individuals who violate international norms that 
prohibit gross human rights violations, need to be held accountable for their actions. In this 
respect, the international criminal tribunals have contributed to the rule of law by ‘reassert[ing] 
the vital truth that every person, at every level of seniority and influence, is subject to [the] 
law’.269 Since its establishment, the ICTY has indicted 161 people for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, of which 141 
were either sentenced, acquitted, referred or had their proceedings terminated in another 
way.270 The ICC currently conducts proceedings on 21 cases resulting from eight situations 
(Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Darfur (Sudan), Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Kenya, Libya, Mali and Uganda).271 
These numbers, although illustrative of the courts’ high workload, are vanishingly small when 
compared to the number of international crimes committed around the globe. The currently 
existing international criminal judicial bodies not only lack the jurisdiction but also the resources 
to address them. They are ill-equipped to make more than a marginal contribution to ending 
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impunity. Instead, they need to strengthen domestic accountability mechanisms272 and be 
selective about their cases. As Brammertz explains, the ICTY adopted a combined ‘top down’ 
and ‘bottom up’ approach – targeting lower-level perpetrators in the start-up phase of the 
tribunal and moving onto more high level perpetrators once the tribunal’s expertise and its 
political support had increased.273 In addition, a balance needed to be found between 
comprehensive indictments, which would cover all crimes a perpetrator was believed to be 
responsible for, and practical considerations, particularly concerning the duration of the trial.274  
The contribution of international criminal courts and tribunals to tackling impunity – though 
important in those cases that actually make it onto the docket – must for the time being remain 
limited. At the same time, the focus on international criminal law as it is now also points to some 
of the remaining gaps in the rule of law at the international level. First, to the present day, only 
individuals are subject to the constraints of criminal law at the international level. Other 
international actors, such as multinational corporations, do not fall under the jurisdiction ratione 
personae of any international criminal court. Second, with the exception of EU law and 
international criminal law, international law as a rule does not contain binding obligations for 
other than state actors. This has been considered unsatisfactory in particular with regard to 
human rights law, in light of widespread human rights abuses by natural and legal persons. 
Domestic instruments have often proven insufficient to hold accountable perpetrators who 
operate globally, and flexibly move across borders.275 
Ending impunity consequently remains an elusive goal, despite the considerable merits of the 
international criminal judiciary. The subjection of individuals and legal persons to legal 
constraints is still an area where the international rule of law evidences considerable 
weaknesses. 
6.4 CLARIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The concept of the rule of law implies the existence of a set of legal constraints that guides and 
binds the behaviour of all individuals and all levels of public power. The legal rules need to be 
sufficiently clear in order to provide a reliable and predictable framework. In this respect, 
international courts and tribunals make an important contribution to the rule of law through their 
interpretation and clarification of international law. This contribution goes beyond the cases that 
are submitted to the courts and affects international law as a whole. 
The ICJ, as the only universal international court with general jurisdiction, plays a central role in 
this respect. Its interpretations enjoy the highest respect and are frequently referred to in the 
case law of other courts and tribunals.276 As Couvreur has stated, ‘its jurisprudence indisputably 
contributes to the establishment of a body of “precedents” regarding questions of general 
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international law, the authority and significance of which extend far beyond the parties to a 
particular dispute’.277 It therefore plays a unifying role in international law, contributing to the 
coherence of this body of law and of the case law of other international judicial bodies. Areas in 
which the ICJ has particularly contributed to the clarification of international law include the law 
of state responsibility and the law of immunity.278 
Article 3(2) DSU explicitly provides for the WTO Dispute Settlement System to be ‘a central 
element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system’. As the panel in 
United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 held: ‘The security and predictability 
in question are of “the multilateral trading system”. The multilateral trading system is, per force, 
composed not only of States but also, indeed mostly, of individual economic operators. The lack 
of security and predictability affects mostly these individual operators’.279 To that end, the 
Dispute Settlement System is mandated to ‘clarify the existing provisions of those agreements 
in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law’.280 Unlike other 
international courts and tribunals, the WTO Dispute Settlement System follows a primarily 
textual interpretation approach, giving central importance to the wording of the agreements. As 
Article 3(2) and 19(2) DSU provide, the WTO panels and AB may not ‘add to or diminish the 
rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements’. In that regard, Van den Bossche 
argues that the high respect enjoyed by the WTO AB today is ‘to a large extent due to the 
Appellate Body’s choice for, and consistent application of, a ‘text first’ approach to 
interpretation’.281 
In the field of international criminal law, the ICTY has made a significant contribution through its 
interpretation and clarification of the nascent legal regime, in particular concerning the modes of 
liability and elements of crime under customary international law.282 Its decisions have informed 
later case law by other international criminal tribunals and have strengthened legal certainty in 
international criminal law. 
As a human rights court, the ECtHR sees its role not only in the provision of individual justice 
but also in the clarification of general human rights standards for the Member States of the 
Council of Europe. It has stated that ‘its judgments serve not only to decide those cases brought 
before it but, more generally, to elucidate, safeguard and develop the rules instituted by the 
Convention, thereby contributing to the observance by the States of the engagements 
undertaken by them as Contracting Parties’.283 The contribution of the ECtHR thus helps to 
clarify and strengthen the human rights system in Europe and ideally to decrease the need for 
judicial remedies. 
While international courts and tribunals contribute to the growing body of precedents on 
international law with every decision rendered, some courts have additionally been provided 
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with specific – non-contentious – procedures focused solely on providing legal interpretation. 
Two examples are illustrative in that regard.284 
First, Article 96(a) of the UN Charter provides that the UN General Assembly and the UN 
Security Council may request the ICJ ‘to give an advisory opinion on any legal question’. Article 
96(b) UN Charter additionally grants that possibility to ‘other organs of the United Nations and 
specialized agencies’ if authorized by the UN General Assembly, provided they request 
clarification on legal questions ‘arising within the scope of their activities’. The ICJ thus has the 
opportunity and competence to provide legal guidance to the UN, and consequently to 
strengthen the rule of law in the activities of the organization. Although they are not legally 
binding, advisory opinions enjoy a high degree of authority due to the Court’s standing. 
However, they have also caused some controversy in the past, when an issue was perceived to 
be contentious and the advisory proceedings were seen as a ‘back door’ in order to circumvent 
the lack of jurisdiction. So far, the ICJ has rendered 27 advisory opinions on a diversity of issues 
ranging from the accession of Member States to the UN and the legality of the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons to the construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the 
unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo. Advisory proceedings are also foreseen in 
the ITLOS, either by the Seabed Disputes Chamber285 or by the Tribunal, if this is provided for in 
an international agreement.286 The Seabed Disputes Chamber delivered an advisory opinion on 
1 February 2011,287 and the Tribunal received its first request for an advisory opinion on 
28 March 2013 from the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission.288 
Second, under Article 218(11) TFEU, the European Parliament, the Council of the EU, the 
European Commission or an EU Member State may obtain the Opinion of the ECJ as to 
whether an envisaged international agreement is compatible with the provisions of the TEU and 
the TFEU. That provision has the aim of ‘forestalling complications which would result from legal 
disputes concerning the compatibility with the Treaties of international agreements binding upon 
the EU’.289 Where the opinion of the Court is adverse, the international agreement envisaged 
may not enter into force unless it is amended or the Treaties are revised. Furthermore, pursuant 
to 267 TFEU, the ECJ has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of 
the Treaties and of acts of the various Union institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies. That 
mechanism aims to avoid divergences in the interpretation of EU law by national courts. Article 
267 TFEU confers on national courts the power and, in certain circumstances, an obligation, to 
make a reference to the ECJ once the national court considers that a case pending before it 
raises issues involving an interpretation or assessment of the validity of provisions of EU law. 290  
The ECJ has emphasized that the system established by Article 267 TFEU with a view to 
ensuring that EU law is interpreted uniformly throughout the Member States establishes direct 
cooperation between the ECJ and the national courts by means of a procedure that is 
completely independent of any initiative by the parties. In that regard, the system of references 
for a preliminary ruling is based on a dialogue between one court and another, the initiation of 
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which depends entirely on the national court’s assessment as to whether a reference is 
appropriate and necessary. 291 
The clarification of international law goes hand in hand with its development. Whereas some 
scholars have identified law-making as one of the functions of international courts and 
tribunals,292 others do not go that far.293 But even without crossing the threshold to actual law-
making, courts can ‘thicken’294 international law by creating a body of precedents that impacts 
not only on subsequent judicial decisions but also on political discussions about the content and 
scope of the law. The ICJ, for example, although generally considered to be one of the more 
restrained courts, has created a body of case law that has shaped and developed international 
law far beyond the scope of the disputes that were actually submitted to it.295 Couvreur refers by 
way of example to the ICJ’s decisions on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.296 
Other authors similarly highlight the various ways in which international courts and tribunals 
have shaped international law, starting with the considerable contributions of the IUSCT to the 
rules of international arbitration and the issues of nationality, attribution and expropriation in 
international law, as well as the ITLOS with its case law on functional protection, precise 
allocation of damages, the protection of procedural rights in environmental cases and the 
delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. With regard to the CJEU, 
Lenaerts states that it ‘had to create new norms that would supplement and complete the legal 
order established by the Treaty, aligning it with both public international law and the 
fundamental constitutional tenets common to its Member States’ in order to ensure the 
legitimacy of the EU legal order.297 Finally, the ECtHR considers the ECHR as a ‘living 
instrument’ and applies an evolutive interpretation, aiming to render its rights ‘practical and 
effective’.298  
Critics who measure the contribution of the international judiciary to the rule of law only based 
on the number and the nature of the disputes they settled overlook that the courts’ impact 
transcends the individual case and affects the international legal order as a whole. Despite the 
fact that judgments are binding only inter partes, and despite the lack of a rule of precedent in 
international law, judicial decisions contribute to shaping the standards of the entire international 
legal system.299 The importance that lies in the clarification and development of international law 
for the promotion of the rule of law must not be underestimated. 
7. CONCLUSION 
The past two and a half decades have seen an unprecedented multiplication of international 
adjudicative bodies, which enjoy increasing powers and deal with an ever-growing number of 
cases. Despite concerns about the possible negative consequences for the unity of international 
law, this development has to be welcomed from a rule of law perspective. International courts 
and tribunals settle disputes peacefully by legal means, assess the compliance of public power 
with international legal constraints, tackle impunity and contribute to the clarification and 
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development of international law. All of their functions are aimed towards promoting and 
strengthening the rule of law.  
While there can therefore be no doubt about the important contribution of the international 
judiciary to the rule of law, attention needs to be drawn to the remaining challenges.  
The multiplication of international tribunals has widened the range of possibilities for states to 
settle their disputes peacefully by legal means, to obtain legitimation through compliance 
assessment by an independent body, and to combat impunity for the most serious crimes. This, 
and the significant contributions of every individual court and tribunal, are to be welcomed from 
a rule of law perspective. However, the unstructured and non-hierarchical growth of the 
international judicial system has also raised concerns with regard to the potential impact on the 
coherence of international law.300 Scholars and practitioners fear that the fragmentation of the 
institutional framework might translate into a fragmentation of the legal framework. Competing 
jurisdictions, parallel proceedings, conflicting decisions and forum shopping might threaten not 
only the rule of law and the legitimacy of the international legal order but risk that ‘the very 
essence of a normative system of law will be lost’.301 These concerns abounded particularly in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, when they were prominently taken up by two successive ICJ 
presidents and triggered a wealth of scholarship. Today, it can be stated that these potential 
problems largely did not materialize.302 In fact, open contradictions in the case law of different 
international courts – as often illustrated with the saga of the Nicaragua, Tadic and Genocide 
cases – have remained a rare exception.303 This corresponds to the observation already made 
by Charney in the late 1990s, that in the ‘core areas of international law, the different 
international tribunals of the late twentieth century do share relatively coherent views’.304 An 
important role in the avoidance of conflicts between the various tribunals can be attributed to the 
emergence of a transnational judicial dialogue – between international courts and tribunals and 
between international and domestic courts.305 Indeed, Brown has argued that there is an 
increasing commonality in the practice of international courts to the application of rules 
concerning issues of procedure and remedies, and that this represents the emergence of a 
common law of international adjudication. This suggests that international courts can develop 
common approaches to the challenges that they face in the age of proliferation. It also suggests 
that international courts do not generally operate as self-contained regimes, but rather that they 
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regard themselves as forming part of a community of international courts, which has positive 
implications for the development of the international legal system.306 Furthermore, although 
international law does not have rules on precedent or stare decisis, courts tend to rely on their 
own prior decisions and have frequently adopted a deferential approach to decisions rendered 
by other institutions. The judgments and advisory opinions of the ICJ notably enjoy a high 
degree of authority and are often cited in the case law of other tribunals. Consequently, the 
fragmentation of international law through international adjudication causes less alarm today 
than it did two decades ago. Nevertheless, frictions remain and need to be addressed. Some 
have argued for the creation of an international ‘supreme court’ or urged the ICJ to take up this 
role. However, this solution appears not only politically and practically unfeasible, but it would 
also take away the benefits of an international judiciary with many voices, areas of expertise 
and backgrounds.307 Instead, it is the task of every single international judge to recognize his 
role in the wider system and realize the responsibility that this entails. Today, judicial dialogue is 
still ad hoc and unpredictable, and rather unevenly exercised across the range of judicial 
bodies. The ICJ, for example, remains a relatively self-contained body, which rarely relies on 
decisions other than its own. In sum, judges cannot live in ‘splendid isolation’308 but must be 
aware of the competences and case law of other institutions and maintain an open dialogue.309 
Courts and tribunals need to enter into such an open dialogue with their international, 
supranational and domestic counterparts in order to avoid the potential negative facets of the 
institutional mosaic, in particular concerning competing jurisdictions and conflicting decisions. 
This dialogue can be informal, particularly through reference and deference to the decisions of 
other courts and tribunals, but it can also be formalized through regular visits and exchanges 
between the different courts. 
A second point of concern – and a ‘more disturbing element’ to some310 – is the institutional 
design of most international courts, which continues to rely on state consent in order to establish 
jurisdiction. While compulsory jurisdiction is exercised by a number of courts, many important 
courts, including the ICJ, do not figure among them. This lack of compulsory jurisdiction has 
received considerably less attention than the issue of fragmentation, although its negative 
impact on the rule of law is arguably far more severe. A system in which all levels of public 
power are equally subjected to legal constraints does not square with a judicial system that can 
fulfil its functions only upon the agreement of the parties. Compulsory jurisdiction is in need of 
strengthening at the international level and reforms for those international courts and tribunals 
that still operate on a voluntary basis ought to be considered as a matter of urgency. At the 
same time, the capacities of the international adjudicative bodies must be enhanced through 
adequate financing and staffing, thereby allowing the international judiciary to maintain 
reasonably short timeframes for their proceedings while also respecting aspects of procedural 
fairness.  
Lastly, the expanding caseload of international courts and tribunals is both a blessing and a 
curse. While on the one hand the increased recourse to adjudicative bodies strengthens the rule 
of law, it also creates capacity problems for the judiciary. Short on resources and staff, many 
courts face a considerable backlog of pending cases, leading to increasingly long trials. In line 
with the maxim ‘justice delayed is justice denied’, this situation weakens the rule of law. Several 
courts and tribunals have recognized the need for action and have taken measures, ranging 
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from ‘practice directions’ for parties and judges at the ICJ311 to the increased use of the single-
judge procedure at the ECtHR.312 While these steps may be successful in reducing the backlog, 
they can also have negative effects on courts’ procedural fairness and consequently on the rule 
of law. The ECtHR, for example, managed to reduce the number of cases on its docket from 
more than 160000 in 2011 to less than 100000 in 2014.313 This significant decrease was largely 
due to the strong reliance on the new competence of single judges to declare cases 
inadmissible ‘where such a decision can be taken without further examination’.314 Single judge 
decisions are not only not published, they are also ‘no longer than a one-page letter stating the 
formal ground for rejection without further reasoning or argumentation’.315 There can be 
considerable doubts on the fairness of a judicial procedure that in many cases makes it difficult 
for the applicant to understand the grounds on which the decision was taken and severely limits 
the possibility for internal and external control. Not only will the authority of such a decision be 
weaker, it may also negatively impact on the legitimacy of the court or tribunal, which should 
strive to reconcile efficiency with procedural fairness. Only if both factors are ensured can the 
judiciary effectively contribute to the rule of law.  
Finding answers to these challenges will be essential for the further strengthening of the 
international judiciary’s contribution to the rule of law. 
What is more, international courts and tribunals are by no means a panacea for all the problems 
facing the international community. As Lon Fuller put it: ‘the most we can expect of constitutions 
and courts is that they save us from the abyss; they cannot be expected to lay out very many 
compulsory steps toward truly significant accomplishment’.316 Furthermore, notwithstanding the 
crucial role of adjudication in the international legal order, judicial settlement may have 
unintended effects on the development of the law. Notably, there exists a tension between the 
retrospective analysis of the rights and duties of states involved in litigation needed for the 
settlement of disputes on the one hand, and the prospective effect of the principles emerging 
from the judicial decision that may govern future conduct on the other hand. The absence of an 
international legislature implies that judicial pronouncements are not easily overturned, and a 
judicial decision may prematurely restrict the development of the law in areas that are in flux.317 
Finally, bringing issues such as the permissibility of the killing of innocents by nuclear weapons 
within the realm of judicial reasoning may detract from the relevant moral standard and leave 
the prohibition in a weakened state.318 
                                               
311 See Couvreur (n 12). 
312 See Lemmens (n 16). 
313 ECHR, Press conference President Dean Spielmann 30 January 2014, 
<www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20140130_Spielmann_JY_PC_ENG.pdf>. 
314 Art 27ECHR. 
315 Janneke Gerards, ‘Inadmissibility Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights: A Critique of the Lack of 
Reasoning’ (2014) Human Rights Law Review 1, 6. 
316 Fuller (n 85) 44. See the similar sentiment expressed by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld with respect to the 
UN: ‘It has been said that the United Nations was not created in order to bring us heaven, but in order to save us from 
hell. I think that sums up as well as anything I have heard both the essential role of the United Nations and the 
attitude of mind that we should bring to its support’: United Nations, Address by Secretary-General Dag 
Hammarskjöld at University of California Convocation, Berkeley, California, Thursday, May 13, 1954, at 10:00 A.M. 
(Pacific Coast Time) (UN Doc SG/382). 
317 See Lowe (n 111) 209-222. 
318 Koskenniemi (n 36) 140, 152-153 and 161, arguing that the ICJ should not have been asked the question of the 
permissibility of nuclear weapons in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (n 36), and that the Court’s 
silence was beneficial ‘inasmuch as it, and it only, could leave room for the workings of the moral impulse, the 
irrational non-foundational appeal against the killing of the innocent’ (at 153). 
44 
 
The imperfect but important contribution of international courts consists in convincing other 
actors in international law of a more rigorous application of the rule of law at all levels. That 
arguably implies making international law ‘a better example of a legal system’,319 thereby 
conforming to a greater extent with what may be the real purpose of international law and of the 
rule of law in the international realm: not the protection of sovereign states, but the protection of 
the populations committed to their charge.320 States are indeed not ends in themselves, but 
instruments for the well-being of human individuals, who are ends in themselves.321 International 
and supranational courts infuse predictability and security in the international legal order, 
creating space for the liberty of individuals and groups. Such liberty as independence from the 
power of others, including public authorities, can only be realized by that form of moral 
association called ‘the rule of law’.322 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
319 Waldron (n 141) 46-7. See also Simmonds (n 114) 5, 46, 99, proposing an archetypal concept of law: to count as 
‘law’, a regime or system must approximate to the archetype to some degree. That archetype can be reached to 
varying degrees, which implies that it also serves as a guiding ideal ‘to which legal systems ought to strive to conform 
more closely’, and social practices therefore ‘count as instances of law only when they partially embody an idea that 
they can never fully realize’; see also Rawls (n 113) 207, arguing that the precepts of justice associated with the rule 
of law ‘are those that would be followed by any system of rules which perfectly embodied the idea of a legal system’; 
and Kelsen (n 144) ix, describing the approach to the aim of world peace as ‘one of slow and steady perfection of the 
international legal order’. 
320 See Koskenniemi (n 36) 145, suggesting that arguably ‘the law’s purpose is to protect the innocent’, adding that ‘it 
is hard to see a more basic purpose for it in a system that excludes reference to personal virtue’. 
321 Waldron (n 112) 24 building on Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Mary Gregor (ed) CUP 
1785/1999) 78–79. 
322 Simmonds (n 114) 152, describing it as ‘a common good that is intrinsic to law’s nature’. See also De Baere (n 83) 
382-383, with respect to the rule of law as the cornerstone of European integration. 
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